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We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream ﬁrms’ ability to sustain tacit
collusion in a repeated game. We identify several eﬀects and show that the net eﬀect of
vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Most importantly, vertical mergers facilitate
collusion through the operation of an outlets eﬀect: cheating unintegrated ﬁrms can no
longer proﬁtably sell to the downstream aﬃliates of their integrated rivals. However, vertical
integration also gives rise to an opposing punishment eﬀect: it is typically more diﬃcult to
punish an integrated structure, so that integrated ﬁrms are able to make more proﬁts in
the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream ﬁrms. When downstream ﬁrms can
condition their prices or quantities on upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers, two additional eﬀects
arise, both of which further facilitate upstream collusion. First, an unintegrated upstream
ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁts are reduced by the reaction eﬀect which arises since the downstream
unit of the integrated ﬁrm will now react aggressively to upstream deviations. Second, an
integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt is reduced by the lack-of-commitment eﬀect as it cannot
commit to its own downstream price when deviating upstream.
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Many famous cases of collusion documented in the literature have involved intermediate goods
industries. Further, a signiﬁcant fraction of those cases involved industries where one or more
ﬁrms were vertically integrated.1 Yet existing theories of collusion deal only with collusion
between ﬁrms selling to consumers (or atomistic buyers). In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst
examination of the often more relevant case where colluding ﬁrms sell to downstream ﬁrms
which are strategic buyers with interdependent demands. Our particular focus is on the eﬀect
of vertical integration on the possibility of collusion in such markets. Why is vertical integration
such a common feature of collusive industries? Does vertical integration facilitate upstream
collusion, and if so, when should it be a concern for anti-trust regulators?
Following the Chicago School revolution of anti-trust policy in the early 1980s, vertical
restraints were considered to be eﬃciency-enhancing. In the last decade, however, regulators
and anti-trust authorities have shown an increased interest in prosecuting cases with vertical
aspects (see, e.g., Kwoka and White (1999, part 3), Riordan and Salop (1995), Klass and
Salinger (1995)). At the same time, academics have been giving increased attention to the
potential anti-competitive eﬀects of vertical restraints and the nascent literature in this area
has expanded considerably in recent years.2 But this literature has — until now — taken a strictly
static view of the interaction between ﬁrms. In contrast, we investigate the impact of vertical
mergers in a dynamic game of repeated interaction between upstream and downstream ﬁrms.
In each period, M upstream ﬁrms produce a homogeneous intermediate good and make
public two-part tariﬀ oﬀers to supply this good to N downstream ﬁrms. Downstream ﬁrms
purchase the intermediate good and transform it into a homogeneous or diﬀerentiated ﬁnal
good, competing in either prices or quantities to supply consumers. This interaction is repeated
over an inﬁnite horizon. In the absence of collusion, vertical mergers do not aﬀect the equilibrium
allocation. This provides us with a particularly clean setting in which to evaluate the potential
collusive eﬀects of vertical mergers.
We focus our analysis on collusion between upstream ﬁrms. There are several reasons for
such a focus. First, as mentioned above, collusion seems to be more prevalent in intermediate
goods industries, perhaps because these industries are often more concentrated or sell goods
which are more homogeneous. Second, policy towards vertical mergers also seems to reﬂect
this fact. The US Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines anticipate the idea that vertical merger
may facilitate collusion but also focus exclusively on upstream collusion. Thirdly, from a the-
oretical point of view the analysis of collusion between downstream ﬁrms selling to consumers
corresponds to the standard case of collusion which is by now well understood — although the
acquisition of a supplier by one of these ﬁrms in a dynamic setting has yet to be considered.
One would of course like to know how vertical integration might facilitate collusion between
ﬁrms at each level of the vertical hierarchy; this is an open research question, but one can view
o u ra n a l y s i sa saﬁrst step along this road. We investigate the more limited question of how
1See for example Tosdal’s (1917) description of vertical mergers in the early twentieth century German Steel
cartels, as well as Levenstein’s (1997) description of the bromine cartel. Other examples of collusion involving
some vertically integrated ﬁrms include railways (see, e.g., Porter (1983)) and timber-cutting (Baldwin, Marshall
and Richard, (1997)). See also Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2000) on joint bidding for oil and gas tracts.
2See for example, the recent contributions by Chen (2001), Choi and Yi (2001), Riordan (1998), and Chen
and Riordan (2003); see Rey and Tirole (2003) for a survey.
1vertical integration can facilitate the maintenance of monopoly proﬁt levels for the industry as
a whole, where all of these proﬁts are extracted by the upstream ﬁrms.
This focus is less restrictive than it might at ﬁrst appear for the following reasons. First,
we show that because of the Bertrand-like structure of competition in the upstream market,
the ability to collude has an all-or-nothing feature when no ﬁrm is integrated: whenever it
is possible to sustain an equilibrium with positive proﬁts for upstream ﬁrms, it is possible to
sustain an equilibrium in which all of the monopoly rents are extracted by upstream ﬁrms and
shared between them. Thus we concentrate our analysis on the maintenance of such monopoly
equilibria, although we brieﬂy examine other equilibria and argue that in these too, vertical
integration reduces total surplus. For the main part of the paper, we will follow the tradition
of Friedman (1971) and consider whether such equilibria are supportable by the play of trigger
strategies: inﬁnite reversion to the repeated play of the static equilibrium of the stage game,
following a deviation by one of the ﬁrms. Characterization of optimal punishment schemes is not
straightforward in this setting because the stage game is not a normal-form game (acceptance
decisions are made after contract oﬀers) and so the results of Abreu (1986, 1988) do not apply.
Nevertheless, we are able to determine the optimal punishment scheme when ﬁnal goods are
homogeneous. In each case, we will say that a vertical merger facilitates collusion if it reduces
the critical discount factor above which the monopoly outcome is sustainable.
In our baseline model, we identify two important and counteracting eﬀects of vertical mergers
on upstream ﬁrms’ ability to collude: the outlets eﬀect and the punishment eﬀect.I nav a r i a t i o n
of the baseline model we show that two other eﬀects — the reaction eﬀect and the lack-of-
commitment eﬀect — can also arise, depending on the timing of upstream and downstream
moves.
Perhaps the most intuitive and important eﬀect of vertical merger is the outlets eﬀect.T o
understand this eﬀect, consider ﬁrst that the optimal way for an upstream ﬁrm to deviate is
typically to undercut the ﬁxed fees and wholesale prices of its rivals only marginally. This allows
the deviant ﬁrm to steal all of its rivals’ business whilst downstream output remains close to
monopoly levels and hence the deviant ﬁrm’s proﬁts are close to monopoly proﬁt. Note that such
a strategy is no longer feasible when one or more downstream ﬁrms is integrated. Integrated
downstream ﬁrms will always prefer to buy from their upstream aﬃliate at marginal cost than
to buy from a deviant ﬁrm at any price which gives the latter positive proﬁts (essentially, they
would rather these proﬁts went to their upstream aﬃliate than to another ﬁrm). Thus integrated
downstream ﬁrms can be relied upon to reject any oﬀer that would be proﬁtable for a deviating
upstream ﬁrm, which can help to enforce the collusive agreement. A deviating upstream ﬁrm
cannot hope to attain the full monopoly proﬁtf r o md e v i a t i n gi fo n eo rm o r ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrms
are integrated with its rivals. We call this the outlets eﬀect of vertical integration since vertical
integration by an upstream ﬁrm reduces the number of outlets through which its rivals can sell
when deviating, generally reducing their proﬁt from cheating and thus facilitating collusion.
Counteracting the outlets eﬀect is the punishment eﬀect. The punishment eﬀect is also
quite intuitive and arises in our set-up because downstream ﬁrms may earn rents in the non-
cooperative equilibrium of the model. If an upstream ﬁrm integrates with a downstream ﬁrm,
these rents now become part of the proﬁt of the merged entity. Thus the merged entity can
expect to make more proﬁts in the non-cooperative punishment phase than the upstream ﬁrm
could make alone. Conversely, absent any changes in market share, the merged entity will
make the same proﬁt as would the upstream ﬁrm alone when monopoly proﬁts are sustained
2upstream. So, for a given collusive market share, the merged entity suﬀers relatively less from
a switch from collusive to punishment phases, and is correspondingly more tempted to cheat on
any collusive agreement. We call this the punishment eﬀect of vertical integration since it arises
because the non-cooperative equilibrium is a less eﬀective punishment of a vertically-merged
ﬁrm than of a stand-alone upstream ﬁrm.
In order to counteract the punishment eﬀect on an integrated ﬁrm’s incentive to cheat, that
ﬁrm’s market share must be increased, leading to an asymmetric distribution of output in an
otherwise symmetric industry. Given such a redistribution of output, we are able to show that
when the ﬁrst upstream-downstream pair in an industry integrates, the outlets eﬀect always
dominates the punishment eﬀect, so vertical merger facilitates collusion. To gain some intuition
for this result, consider that the outlets eﬀect deprives all of the remaining M − 1 upstream
ﬁrms of (at least) 1
Nth of the monopoly proﬁt because when deviating they cannot sell through
the integrated downstream ﬁrm (which represents 1
Nth of sales). The punishment eﬀect, on the
other hand, aﬀects only the integrated upstream ﬁrm and increases its punishment proﬁts by the
amount of the non-cooperative proﬁt in all future periods. Clearly, the integrated downstream
ﬁrm’s single-period non-cooperative proﬁti sl e s st h a n 1
Nth of the monopoly proﬁt, and so the
key step is to show that at the critical discount factor in the absence of integration, the inﬁnite
sum of non-cooperative proﬁts does not amount to more than M−1
M times the monopoly proﬁt.
This follows by the argument given above that, in the absence of integration, upstream ﬁrms can
obtain the whole monopoly proﬁt when deviating, which determines that the critical discount
factor in this case is M−1
M .
We examine several extensions to this basic set-up to show that our result is robust. First,
we consider the optimal punishment scheme when ﬁnal goods are homogeneous. Second, we
consider what happens when upstream oﬀers to downstream ﬁrms are private information to
the contracting parties rather than being publicly observed.
Finally, we modify the timing of our original game to allow us to illustrate two further eﬀects
which can occur with vertical integration. Our baseline model has upstream ﬁrms making
contract oﬀers simultaneously with downstream ﬁrms setting prices (or choosing quantities).
However, under some circumstances it may be more natural to think of downstream ﬁrms
setting their strategic variable after they know what input costs they will face. This new timing
introduces some further considerations to the dynamic game, however, because now downstream
prices (or quantities) can potentially react to upstream deviations within the same period that
they are made. The reaction eﬀect arises from the fact that the integrated downstream ﬁrm
can now react aggressively (reducing its price or increasing its quantity) during the period
of deviation, reducing the proﬁts of the deviator. Thus the reaction eﬀect further facilitates
collusion.
Whilst the ﬂexibility of the integrated ﬁrm’s downstream price is helpful in punishing its
rivals’ deviations, it becomes a liability for the integrated ﬁrm when it wants to deviate it-
self. The integrated ﬁrm can always do weakly better by posting its own downstream price
simultaneously with its deviant upstream oﬀers (as it does in our benchmark model). When
downstream prices are set after upstream oﬀers are made, downstream ﬁrms rationally antici-
pate that the deviating integrated ﬁrm will set its downstream price equal to the best response
to their own anticipated prices. This means that the integrated ﬁrm’s price will generally not
be optimal from the point of view of maximizing the overall industry proﬁt during the period
of deviation (which the integrated ﬁrm could extract using ﬁxed fees). Thus, when downstream
3ﬁrms can condition their retail prices on upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers, the integrated ﬁrm
will suﬀer from a lack-of-commitment eﬀect: its inability to commit to its own downstream
price when making deviant contract oﬀers reduces the integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt. The
lack-of-commitment eﬀect therefore makes upstream collusion easier to sustain.
Our analysis of the optimal punishment scheme employed by the upstream ﬁrms in our
game is of independent interest to the particular application studied. The reason is that the
literature on collusion has focused (almost) exclusively on repeated normal-form games, and
very little is known about optimal punishment in repeated extensive-form games such as ours.
In repeated normal-form games, it is well known that any subgame-perfect outcome can be
s u p p o r t e db yasimple penal code (Abreu (1988)), i.e., a proﬁle with the property that any
deviation by a player from the equilibrium path is punished by the same punishment path (penal
code), so that the continuation play after a player’s deviation is independent of the particular
deviation chosen, and depends only on the identity of the deviator. Our game provides what
is to our knowledge the ﬁrst concrete example showing that the logic of simple penal codes
breaks down in repeated extensive-form games. In our model, sustaining monopoly rents for
upstream ﬁrms may require (for some discount factors) that the continuation play following
an upstream ﬁrm’s deviation depends not only on the identity of the deviator, but also on
the details of the deviant contract oﬀers, so “the punishment must ﬁt the crime”. Intuitively,
in an extensive form game, inﬂicting the worst possible punishment on a cheating upstream
ﬁrm not only involves punishing the deviator in all future periods but also, in so far as is
possible, within the same period. A deviant (unintegrated) upstream ﬁrm can proﬁtably deviate
only if at least one downstream ﬁrm accepts the deviant oﬀer. Hence, since downstream ﬁrms
make acceptance/rejection decisions after observing upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers, the optimal
punishment scheme should provide incentives for downstream ﬁrms to reject deviant contracts
by prescribing the play of an equilibrium in the continuation game that is favorable to those
downstream ﬁrms that do indeed reject the deviant oﬀers. The optimal punishment scheme
diﬀers from a simple penal code in two ways. First, depending on the details of the deviant
oﬀers, diﬀerent downstream ﬁrms will be induced to reject these oﬀers, and so diﬀerent rewards
should be oﬀered in continuation play. Secondly, even given the actions of the downstream
ﬁrms at the acceptance stage, the optimal distribution of rewards between those ﬁrms that
reject the oﬀers should optimally depend on the details of the oﬀers that those ﬁrms received.
In particular, downstream ﬁrms that received more proﬁtable oﬀers, and that were therefore
more tempted to accept, should be oﬀered larger rewards in continuation play. Again, this
implies that the continuation play must depend not only on the identity of the deviator, but
also on the details of the deviant contracts.
Plan of the Paper. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
baseline model with public oﬀers. In section 3, we investigate the collusive eﬀects of a vertical
merger in this model. The key result is that vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion
relative to the unintegrated benchmark. We then investigate the robustness of this result to
various extensions. In section 4.1 we set out the optimal punishment scheme for the case when
downstream ﬁrms’ goods are homogeneous, and show that the logic of simple penal codes breaks
down in our repeated extensive-form game. Section 4.2 shows that our result still holds when
upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers are private information to the contracting parties. In section
4.3, we analyze a variation of the base model, where downstream ﬁrms can condition their retail
prices or quantities on ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers, highlighting the additional eﬀects which arise to
4further facilitate collusion in this setting. Finally, we discuss our results and conclude in section
5. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2 The Baseline Model
We consider a vertically related industry with M ≥ 2 identical upstream ﬁrms, U1,U2,...,UM,
and N ≥ 2 symmetric downstream ﬁrms (or retailers), D1,D 2,..., DN. The upstream ﬁrms
produce a homogeneous intermediate good at constant marginal cost c, which for simplicity we
set equal to 0, and sell this good to the downstream ﬁrms. The downstream ﬁrms transform
the intermediate good into a ﬁnal good on a one-to-one basis at zero marginal costs of produc-
tion, and sell it to consumers. Consumers view the ﬁnal good as either homogeneous or else
symmetrically diﬀerentiated (by downstream ﬁrm).
The M upstream ﬁrms make simultaneous and public take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariﬀ oﬀers
to the downstream ﬁrms. Ui’s oﬀer to Dj takes the form ωij ≡ (wij,F ij),w h e r ewij is the
marginal wholesale price and Fij is the ﬁxed fee. The ﬁxed fee Fij has to be paid when the oﬀer
is accepted, while the wholesale price wij has to be paid for each unit that is ordered and then
sold in the retail market to consumers. If Ui does not make an oﬀer to Dj,t h e nωij = ∅.I n
the retail market, the N downstream ﬁrms compete either in prices or quantities. That is, Dj
sets a retail price pj (under price competition) or quantity qj (under quantity competition).
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Each period, an identical set of consumers come to the
downstream market to buy the ﬁnal good. Demand for downstream ﬁrm Dj’s ﬁnal good is given
by Q(pj;p−j),w h e r epj is the price of Dj’s ﬁn a lg o o d ,a n dp−j the vector of prices charged by
Dj’s downstream rivals. Symmetry between downstream ﬁrms means that the demand function
Q(·;·) is the same for all N downstream ﬁrms, and that Q(pj;p−j)=Q(pj;p0
−j) whenever p0
−j
results from p−j by just changing the identities of the downstream ﬁrms that charge the various
prices. Downstream ﬁrm Dj’s inverse demand is denoted P(qj;q−j),w h e r eqj is Dj’s output,
and q−j a vector of outputs by the N − 1 downstream rivals. Throughout the paper, we will
denote by QM,p M,a n dΠM the joint-proﬁt maximizing industry output, retail price, and
industry proﬁt, respectively.
We impose standard assumptions on the demand function. Holding ﬁxed downstream rivals’
prices, Dj’s demand is positive if it charges a suﬃciently low price, and weakly decreasing in
its own price (and strictly decreasing if Dj’s demand is positive). Holding ﬁx e di t so w np r i c e ,
Dj’s demand is weakly increasing in downstream rival Dk’s price (and strictly increasing if
both Dj and Dk face positive demand). Further, we assume that demand is such that in the
associated one-shot simultaneous-move game in which N (downstream) ﬁrms compete in prices
(respectively, quantities) with downstream ﬁrm Dj facing a constant marginal cost (wholesale
price) wj, there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome.3 See, for instance, Vives (1999) for
conditions on demand that ensure uniqueness.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following linear demand system satisfying these assumptions, which
is frequently used in oligopoly models. We will later illustrate some of our results using this
example.
3In the associated one-shot game, a ﬁrm with high marginal cost wj may make zero proﬁt in equilibrium. In
this case, the ﬁrm’s price/quantity choice will not be uniquely pinned down in equilibrium.














xjxk + H, (1)
where xj is consumption of downstream ﬁrm’s Dj’s product, and H is consumption of the Hick-
sian composite commodity.4 The parameter σ ∈ (0,1], measures the degree of substitutability
between products: products become perfect substitutes as σ → 1,a n di n d e p e n d e n ta sσ → 0.
The timing in each period is as follows:
1. Pricing stage: Upstream ﬁrms U1,...,UM simultaneously make public oﬀers to the down-
stream ﬁrms. At the same time, downstream ﬁrms D1,...,DN simultaneously commit to
prices (or quantities) in the retail market.
2. Acceptance stage: Downstream ﬁrms D1,...,DN simultaneously decide which contract(s)
to accept.5 If they decide to accept a contract, the relevant ﬁxed fee is paid to the
upstream ﬁrm.
3. Output stage: Consumers decide which ﬁnal goods to purchase. Downstream ﬁrms then
order the quantities demanded by consumers from the upstream ﬁrms at the relevant
wholesale prices.
The game is one of perfect monitoring: all past actions become common knowledge at the
e n do fe a c hs t a g e .
O b s e r v et h a td o w n s t r e a mﬁrms set prices (or quantities) before deciding which contract(s)
to accept, if any. Hence, we need to specify payoﬀs when downstream ﬁrm Dj sets a price pj at
which there is positive demand in equilibrium, Q(pj;p−j) > 0 (or, under quantity competition,
when Dj sets a positive quantity qj > 0), but Dj later decides to reject all of its oﬀers, and so
is unable to satisfy consumer demand. While this does not play any role for our analysis, we
may assume that, in this case, the rationed consumers can adjust their demand for the rival
ﬁnal goods accordingly, and so demand for Dj’s rivals is as if pj = ∞ (or qj =0 ). To exclude
equilibria of the stage game in which downstream ﬁrm Dj rations consumers on the equilibrium
path we assume that Dj would have to pay a vanishingly small ﬁne (which may be interpreted
as a “reputation loss”) φ>0 if it were to ration consumers, and consider the limit as φ → 0.6
Upstream and downstream ﬁrms have an inﬁnite horizon. Each ﬁrm aims to maximize the
discounted sum of its future proﬁts, using the common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). Vertically
integrated ﬁrms are assumed to maximize their joint proﬁts, independently of any announced
“transfer prices” between the upstream and downstream aﬃliates. As pointed out by Bonanno
and Vickers (1988), this implies that the vertically integrated downstream ﬁrm’s true wholesale
4The linear-quadratic utility function (and the associated linear demand system) goes back to Bowley (1924).
5Downstream ﬁrms are allowed to accept more than one oﬀer, i.e., contracts are non-exclusive.
6The need for this assumption arises because of the simultaneous timing of upstream oﬀers and downstream
price (or quantity) setting: we need to specify what happens if a downstream ﬁrm incorrectly anticipates upstream
oﬀers and sets its strategic variable in a way which would cause it to make losses if it were to accept the upstream
contracts it is oﬀered. With the alternative sequential timing which we consider in section 4.3, this problem does
not arise as downstream ﬁrms set their strategic variable knowing the contracts which they have been oﬀered.
6price is the marginal cost of its upstream aﬃliate, c =0 . To focus on the potential collu-
sive eﬀects of vertical integration, we assume that a vertical merger does not aﬀect costs or
technology.
Since we are interested in tacit collusion between upstream ﬁrms, we will focus mostly on
collusive equilibria that allow upstream ﬁrms to jointly extract all of the monopoly rents (in
section 3.5 we will justify this focus and also discuss equilibria on upstream ﬁrms’ Pareto frontier
more generally). For simplicity we assume that upstream ﬁrms sustain collusion through inﬁnite
“Nash reversion” (see the classic analysis of Friedman (1971) and the papers which followed
it): any deviation by an upstream ﬁrm is followed, in all subsequent periods, by the play of
the “noncollusive equilibrium” (which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game).7 In
contrast, deviations by unintegrated downstream ﬁrms do not trigger any punishment.
We deﬁne the critical discount factor b δ as the threshold value of δ such that there exists
an equilibrium in which all of the monopoly rents are extracted by upstream ﬁrms if and
only if the discount factor δ satisﬁes δ ≥ b δ. (Note that the way in which the monopoly
proﬁts are divided between upstream ﬁrms is part of the equilibrium description. For δ = b δ,
there will exist a unique market sharing arrangement that allows upstream ﬁrms to extract
the monopoly proﬁt.) We will say that a vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion if it
reduces the critical discount factor b δ. (This notion of facilitating collusion is common in the
industrial organization literature, see, e.g., Tirole (1988).) However, as we will discuss, the
main prediction of our paper — that a vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion — is robust
to a broader notion of facilitating collusion. Whenever some collusive upstream proﬁts can
be sustained under non-integration, the same level of upstream proﬁts can be sustained under
(single) vertical integration. In contrast, for some discount factors, collusive upstream proﬁts
are sustainable under vertical integration, but not under non-integration. Furthermore, those
collusive equilibria that lie on upstream ﬁrms’ Pareto frontier tend to be worse from society’s
point of view than those under non-integration.
Given any market structure, minimizing the critical discount factor above which upstream
collusion is sustainable entails all of the upstream ﬁrms having the same net incentive to deviate.
However, integer constraints will generally complicate this equalization of deviation incentives
in a pure-strategy collusive equilibrium if downstream ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods. (Up-
stream oﬀers will generally involve positive ﬁxed fees, and so each unintegrated downstream ﬁrm
will typically accept at most one oﬀer.) Since such integer constraints complicate the analysis
while they are largely orthogonal to the issues of interest, we allow for public randomization so
that ﬁrms can share the market in a continuous fashion. In particular, we will assume that there
is a public random variable, θ, realized just after the pricing stage but before the acceptance
stage. The random variable is independent of play, being uniformly distributed on [0,1];i t
serves only as a public correlating device.8 Along the collusive equilibrium path, downstream
ﬁrms accept diﬀerent upstream ﬁrms’ oﬀers (between which they are indiﬀerent), depending
on the realization of θ. Since all upstream and downstream ﬁrms make their pricing decisions
7The known results on optimal punishment in repeated normal-form games (e.g., Abreu 1988) generally no
longer hold in repeated extensive-form games. As we will show in section 4.1, simple penal codes are no longer
optimal in our repeated extensive-form game. While the analysis of optimal punishment schemes turns out to be
a complex undertaking, we are able to derive the optimal punishment scheme for the case of homogeneous ﬁnal
goods; see section 4.1.
8We can dispense with the assumption of a public correlating device by using jointly controlled lotteries,
introduced by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968).
7before θ is realized, the realization of θ does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives to deviate.9
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of vertical integration on upstream ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
The analysis proceeds in stages. We begin by examining the properties of the subgame-perfect
equilibria of the stage game, since we assume that ﬁrms will revert to the inﬁnite play of
such equilibria after a deviation. We then analyze ﬁrms’ abilities to collude under two market
structures: non-integration (NI), where no upstream ﬁrm is vertically integrated, and single
integration (SI), where a single upstream ﬁrm is vertically integrated with a single downstream
ﬁrm. We then use the results from these analyses to show that vertical integration facilitates
upstream collusion: the critical discount factor above which monopoly rents for the upstream
ﬁrms can be sustained is lower under single integration than under non-integration.
3.1 Noncollusive Equilibrium
While the stage game has multiple equilibria, they all share the feature that upstream ﬁrms
make zero proﬁts on their contracts with unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, independently of the
number of vertical mergers. This result obtains since upstream ﬁrms produce a homogeneous
intermediate good and compete in (nonlinear) prices. The intuition behind the proof is thus
similar to that in the classic Bertrand model: essentially, upstream ﬁrms can always slightly
undercut any contract which allows their rivals make a positive proﬁt.
Lemma 1 Independently of market structure, each upstream ﬁrm makes zero proﬁto ni t sc o n -
tracts with unintegrated downstream ﬁrms in any (pure-strategy) equilibrium of the stage game.
Deﬁne the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium as the play of the following set of strate-
gies. Each upstream ﬁrm makes oﬀers of the form (wij,F ij)=( 0 ,0) to each (unintegrated)
downstream ﬁrm, and each downstream ﬁrm chooses the corresponding noncollusive price




and qNC =a r g m a x q qP(q;qNC,...,qNC). At the acceptance
stage, each unintegrated downstream ﬁrm accepts at least one contract along the equilibrium
path.10
Lemma 2 Independently of market structure, the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium is a pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game.
9Instead of using a public correlating device, upstream ﬁrms may share collusive proﬁts by making side
payments at the end of each period. (Side payments are used only to resolve integer problems, and so no ﬁrm
will need to make side payments larger than Π
M/N. )F a i l u r et om a k es i d ep a y m e n t si sa s s u m e dt ot r i g g e rt h e
(inﬁnite) punishment phase; following a deviation at the pricing stage, however, side payments need not be made.
It can be shown that if no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate at the pricing stage, then no ﬁrm has an incentive to
deviate by not making the required side payments.
10Following a deviation at the pricing or acceptance stage, we require the play of a subgame-perfect equilibrium
in the ensuing subgame.
8In the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium, each upstream ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt. In con-
trast, downstream ﬁr m sm a k ep o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts, unless ﬁnal goods are homogeneous and down-
stream competition is in prices. We denote by πNC the proﬁt that each downstream ﬁrm will
make in the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium. Notice that the allocation in the symmetric
noncollusive equilibrium is independent of the number of vertical mergers. This feature of our
set-up is useful since it allows us to focus attention on the collusive eﬀects of vertical integration.
While there may be a multiplicity of pure-strategy equilibria of the stage game, we believe
that the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium is the most appealing one.11 However, we do not
require that ﬁrms coordinate on this equilibrium in the punishment phase. Since all noncol-
lusive equilibria yield zero payoﬀs to the upstream ﬁrms, we allow ﬁrms to coordinate on any
noncollusive equilibrium following the deviation of an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm. Following a
deviation of an integrated ﬁrm, we assume that ﬁrms coordinate on the noncollusive equilibrium
that yields the smallest proﬁt to the deviant integrated ﬁrm. This is the symmetric noncollusive
equilibrium.12
3.2 Collusive Equilibrium: Non-Integration
We now consider the collusive equilibrium when no ﬁrm is vertically integrated. As pointed out
in section 2, we focus on the collusive equilibrium where the upstream ﬁrms jointly extract all
of the monopoly rents ΠM.
For the monopoly rents to be extracted, each downstream ﬁrm Dj must, at the pricing
stage, set the monopoly price pj = pM (under price competition) or the monopoly quantity qj =
QM/N = qM (under quantity competition).13 At the same time, each of the M upstream ﬁrms
makes the same oﬀer (wM,FM) to each of the N downstream ﬁrms. The collusive wholesale
price wM ≤ pM is chosen such that it is a best response for each downstream ﬁrm Dj to charge
the price pM (or the quantity qM), given the equilibrium behavior of its N − 1 downstream
rivals. The ﬁxed fee FM ≥ 0 is chosen so as to extract all of the rents from a downstream ﬁrm.
If ﬁnal goods are homogeneous and downstream competition is in prices, (wM,FM)=( pM,0);
11We remark on some asymmetric equilibria below (section 4.1). The symmetric equilibrium is particularly
appealing in the obviously symmetric case when no ﬁrm is integrated. The symmetric equilibrium is also immune
to deviations by upstream-downstream pairs.
12In any Nash equilibrium at the output stage, a downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt is weakly increasing in its down-
stream rivals’ marginal costs, and in the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium, all downstream ﬁrms receive the
intermediate good at a wholesale price of zero. Hence, if the integrated ﬁrm deviates, it makes a per-period proﬁt
of π
NC in the punishment phase (through its downstream aﬃliate).
13The following analysis assumes that each downstream ﬁrm produces the same quantity q
M = Q
M/N in the
collusive equilibrium. This is necessary to extract monopoly proﬁts if ﬁnal goods are symmetrically diﬀerentiated,
but not if ﬁnal goods are homogeneous. In the homogeneous case, any vector of downstream outputs that adds
up to Q
M can be induced by appropriate contracts and be used to implement the monopoly outcome. The
incentives to deviate set out below are unaﬀected by the way in which the production of Q
M is “shared” between
downstream ﬁrms. A deviant upstream ﬁrm can always obtain the collusive industry proﬁti nt h ep e r i o do f
deviation by slightly undercutting its rivals’ oﬀers.
9otherwise, there is double marginalization, and so wM <p M and FM > 0.14 At the acceptance
stage, each downstream ﬁrm accepts one oﬀer along the equilibrium path. Since a downstream
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between each of the M identical oﬀers, its choice of which contract to accept
may depend on the outcome of the public randomization device. At the output stage, each
downstream ﬁrm will then face a demand of qM = Q(pM;pM,...,p M), which it will order from
its upstream supplier at wholesale price wM.
Since all upstream ﬁrms are symmetric, the critical discount factor above which the monopoly
outcome upstream can be sustained is minimized if the upstream ﬁrms share the market
equally.15 Hence, along the equilibrium path, each upstream ﬁrm receives an expected per-
period proﬁto fΠM/M.
Consider now an upstream ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate.16 By oﬀering the contract (wM −
ε,FM − ε) to each of the N downstream retailers, where ε is arbitrarily small, the deviator
c a no b t a i nad e v i a t i o np r o ﬁt arbitrarily close to ΠM. Each downstream ﬁrm would ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to accept such an oﬀer, independently of the acceptance decisions of its downstream
rivals, and to order all units demanded by consumers from the deviator. Production and pricing
will be arbitrarily close to monopoly levels. This (or any other) out-of-equilibrium contract
oﬀer by an upstream ﬁrm triggers a switch to the punishment phase in which ﬁrms play a
noncollusive equilibrium in all future periods and, as discussed above, upstream ﬁrms receive
zero proﬁt. Notice that the proﬁts from deviation and punishment do not depend on whether
downstream competition is in prices or quantities, or indeed whether goods are diﬀerentiated
or homogeneous.17 So, independently of the form that downstream competition takes, under


























































15When N is not an integer multiple of M,d o w n s t r e a mﬁrms use the public randomization device to determine
their acceptances accordingly.
16A deviation by an (unintegrated) downstream ﬁrm does not trigger punishment. However, if downstream
ﬁrm Dj deviates by setting a price pj <p
M (or a quantity qj >q
M), then the collusive strategy proﬁle stipulates
that the deviant Dj rejects all of its contract oﬀers, while each of its downstream rivals accepts one contract
(w
M,F
M). This ensures that no downstream ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. To see that the prescribed
acceptance decisions form a Nash equilibrium at the acceptance stage, note that if Dj rejects its oﬀers, all other
downstream ﬁrms make a nonnegative proﬁt. (Recall that all downstream ﬁr m sm a k ez e r op r o ﬁtw h e ne a c ho n e
of them accepts one oﬀer (w
M,F
M).) Given that Dj’s rivals accept the contract (w
M,F
M), Dj’s best response is
to reject its oﬀer, and incur a vanishingly small loss φ → 0: if it were to accept, it would incur a (non-vanishing)
loss since the contract oﬀer (w
M,F
M) is chosen such that each downstream ﬁr m ’ sb e s t - r e s p o n s ei st os e tt h e
monopoly price p
M (or quantity q
M), given that all downstream rivals charge p
M and accept their oﬀers.
17Because optimal deviations will typically take the form of slightly undercutting of rivals’ oﬀers, most of the
incentive constraints that we will deal with will have this property. We will continue to treat the general case
throughout, except where otherwise noted.




The l.h.s. represents the discounted sum of proﬁts along the collusive equilibrium path, and the
r.h.s. represents the maximum proﬁt a deviant upstream ﬁrm can obtain. Hence, the critical
discount factor above which the monopoly outcome can be sustained is given by (M − 1)/M.
By slightly undercutting its rivals’ oﬀers, a deviant upstream ﬁrm can always “sever the
ties” between its upstream rivals and all of the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms. Since upstream
oﬀers and downstream prices (or quantities) are set simultaneously, this implies that a deviant
upstream ﬁrm can obtain (arbitrarily close to) the collusive industry proﬁti nt h ep e r i o do f
deviation. This holds not only for the monopoly proﬁt ΠM, but more generally for any upstream
industry proﬁt level Π ≤ ΠM. Hence, whenever upstream ﬁrms can sustain some positive proﬁt
level in the collusive equilibrium, they can also sustain the monopoly proﬁt level ΠM.W e
summarize the main result for the case of non-integration in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Under non-integration, the critical discount factor above which it is possible to sus-
tain any positive upstream industry proﬁt Π ∈
¡
0,ΠM¤
is given by b δ
NI
=( M − 1)/M.
3.3 Collusive Equilibrium: Single Integration
We now turn to the collusive equilibrium when one upstream-downstream pair, say U1-D1,i s
vertically integrated. Since the market structure is no longer symmetric, it may be optimal for
upstream collusion to allow the integrated U1-D1 to capture a share of the collusive equilibrium
proﬁtt h a ti sd i ﬀerent from (in fact, larger than) that of the M−1 unintegrated upstream rivals.
Let α denote the collusive market share of the integrated U1-D1. Symmetry of the M − 1
unintegrated upstream ﬁrms implies that the critical discount factor (above which monopoly
proﬁts for the upstream ﬁrms can be sustained) is minimized if each one of them obtains
the same share, (1 − α)/(M − 1), of the collusive equilibrium proﬁt.18 At the pricing stage,
the collusive equilibrium behavior is as outlined above for the case of non-integration: each
upstream ﬁrm oﬀers the contract (wM,FM) to each of the (unintegrated) downstream ﬁrms,
and each downstream ﬁrm charges a price of pM (or sets a quantity of qM). At the acceptance
stage, the acceptance/rejection decisions of the downstream ﬁrms will, in expectation, reﬂect
the market-sharing arrangement under vertical integration.
Consider ﬁrst the incentives to deviate for the integrated ﬁrm U1-D1. Along the equilibrium
path, the ﬁrm obtains an expected per-period proﬁto fαΠM.B yo ﬀering the deviant contract
(wM − ε,FM − ε) t oa l lo ft h eN − 1 unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, where ε is arbitrarily
small, the integrated ﬁrm can obtain their business and make a proﬁt arbitrarily close to the
monopoly proﬁt ΠM in the period of deviation.19 Following the integrated ﬁrm’s deviation,
18Recall from our discussion in section 2 that proﬁts can be shared in an arbitrary fashion by using a public
correlating device at the acceptance stage.
19The integrated U1-D1 cannot extract more than the monopoly proﬁt Π
M in the period of deviation. To
see this, note ﬁrst that industry proﬁts are bounded from above by Π
M. Hence, for U1-D1 to extract more
than Π
M,s o m eo t h e rﬁrm would need to make a loss in the period of deviation. But each downstream ﬁrm can
ensure itself a proﬁt of approximately zero by rejecting all contracts, in which case it would need to pay only the
vanishingly small ﬁne φ. Finally, since all upstream ﬁrms make equilibrium oﬀers involving nonnegative ﬁxed
fees, each upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt must be larger than or equal to zero.
11ﬁrms coordinate on the (symmetric) noncollusive equilibrium in all future periods. In this
noncollusive equilibrium, the integrated ﬁrm makes a per-period proﬁto fπNC through its










Comparing this equation with an upstream ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (2) under non-integration,
we see that there is an additional term on the r.h.s. of (3), δπNC/(1 − δ).T h i s t e r m r e p r e -
sents the punishment eﬀect of vertical integration: it is more diﬃcult to punish an integrated
ﬁrm than an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm. Unless downstream products are homogeneous and
retail competition is in prices, the integrated downstream aﬃliate makes positive proﬁts in the
punishment phase, πNC > 0.
Consider now an unintegrated Ui’s incentives to deviate, i ≥ 2 . There is no punishment
eﬀect for Ui since, in periods following a deviation, all unintegrated upstream ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts, as in the absence of integration. Along the equilibrium path, Ui obtains a per-period
proﬁto f(1−α)ΠM/(M −1).B yo ﬀering instead the deviant contract (wM −ε,FM −ε) to each
of the N −1 unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, for arbitrarily small ε, Uican gain the business of
all the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, and extract (arbitrarily close to) ΠM/N from each one
of them, as above. Importantly, however, the deviant Ui will not be able to extract any proﬁt
from the integrated D1.S i n c eD1 can obtain the intermediate input at zero marginal cost from
its own upstream aﬃliate U1, D1 will not accept any (deviant) contract that does not leave D1
all of the rents. Vertical integration therefore reduces the deviation proﬁt of an unintegrated
upstream ﬁrm by ΠM/N: the amount that it would have made from selling to D1 if D1 were
not integrated. This is what we call the outlets eﬀect of vertical integration. Comparing with
equation (2) above, we can clearly see how the outlets eﬀect slackens the incentive constraint
for an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm:
(1 − α)ΠM








Adding up incentive constraint (3) for the integrated ﬁrm and the M−1 incentive constraints
(4) for the unintegrated ﬁrms, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 4 Under single integration, upstream ﬁrms can collectively extract the monopoly proﬁt
if:







In pooling the incentive constraints to obtain this lemma, we are making the implicit as-
sumption that ﬁrms’ market shares are set in such a way that the individual incentive constraints
(3) and (4) are satisﬁed. The argument is that if there is suﬃcient total surplus from collusion
to satisfy the pooled incentive constraints, then there is a way to arrange market shares to
12divide that surplus such that no individual ﬁrm wants to deviate.20 What does the market-
sharing arrangement look like? Note that market shares are not completely pinned down for
δ>b δ
SI
: there will be a range of α’s which satisfy all the incentive constraints with some slack.
But clearly, for the range of discount factors where vertical integration makes collusion feasible




)w em u s th a v eα> 1
M. This is because vertical
integration makes collusion feasible by slackening the unintegrated ﬁrms’ incentive constraint
(through the outlets eﬀect), whilst tightening integrated ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (through
the punishment eﬀect), so the integrated ﬁr m ’ ss h a r em u s tr i s er e l a t i v e l y .
Sustaining collusion when one ﬁrm is integrated thus requires that the integrated ﬁrm re-
ceives a larger share of the collusive proﬁts than it would if it were not integrated and collusion
was nevertheless still sustainable. Clearly this aﬀects a ﬁrm’s incentive to perform a vertical
merger: we remark upon this further in section 3.6. Before this, we ask whether our prediction
that market shares will indeed be divided in this asymmetric way is reasonable. Firstly, and
most obviously, one can argue from a theoretical point of view that whilst the unintegrated
ﬁrms may apparently suﬀer from a reduction in market share when one ﬁrm integrates, if the




), they now have a smaller share of a much larger
pie. Their proﬁts rise from zero to
(1−α)ΠM
(M−1) , so the vertical integration beneﬁts them as well
as the integrated ﬁrm. Secondly, from an empirical point of view, the prediction that vertically
integrated ﬁrms are on average larger does not seem empirically unreasonable. Acemoglu et
al. (2003) ﬁnd that vertical integration is positively correlated with ﬁrm size in the UK man-
ufacturing sector. In fact, many case studies of cartels report instances of vertically integrated
ﬁrms demanding and receiving larger shares of the collusive pie (e.g., Levenstein (1997), Tosdal
(1917)).
Lemma 4 gives the critical discount factor for the case when ﬁnal goods are (symmetrically)
diﬀerentiated. If ﬁnal goods are homogeneous, however, monopoly proﬁts for upstream ﬁrms
can be sustained for discount factors that are even lower than b δ
SI
—i nf a c t ,f o rany discount
factor δ ≥ 0 when one ﬁrm is integrated. Along the equilibrium path, the integrated D1 sets
the monopoly price pM (or the monopoly quantity QM), while all unintegrated downstream
ﬁrms charge a higher price (or set a zero quantity). At the same time, all upstream ﬁrms sell
through the integrated D1, making unacceptable contract oﬀers (involving high ﬁxed fees and/or
wholesale prices) to the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms. This asymmetric arrangement has the
ﬂavor of a “coordination failure” between unintegrated upstream and downstream ﬁrms. The
deviation proﬁt of an unintegrated ﬁrm is zero since any deviant oﬀer to D1 would be rejected
because of the outlets eﬀect, while all unintegrated downstream ﬁrms have priced themselves
“out of the market”. The integrated ﬁrm’s incentive constraint is the only one that can bind,
so that as its collusive market share α becomes arbitrarily large, the critical discount factor
becomes arbitrarily small. This yields the following result for the special case of homogeneous
goods.
20This is true since ﬁrms’ deviation proﬁts are independent of the collusive market sharing arrangement α.
We are eﬀectively assuming that if the discount factor is low enough to make it necessary, ﬁrms are able to
organize market shares in a way which minimizes the collective incentive to deviate. One can argue that this
method is implicit in most of the collusion literature dating back to Friedman’s classic (1971) work. But in most
previous analyses, the assumption has involved symmetric ﬁrms coordinating on a symmetric outcome, and so is
uncontroversial. See Compte et al. (2002) for an example of the use of this method in an asymmetric setting.
13Lemma 5 If ﬁnal goods are homogeneous, monopoly proﬁts upstream can be sustained for any
discount factor δ ≥ 0.
3.4 The Collusive Eﬀect of Vertical Integration




: under (single) vertical integration,
perfect collusion upstream can be sustained for a larger set of discount factors than under non-
integration. We summarize our key result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a vertically unintegrated industry, a vertical merger facilitates upstream col-
lusion.
A vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm has two opposing eﬀects on
upstream ﬁrms’ incentives to collude. On the one hand, an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm cannot
proﬁtably deviate through a rival’s integrated downstream aﬃliate, thereby reducing the ﬁrm’s
deviation proﬁt (by at least ΠM/N). This outlets eﬀect reduces an unintegrated upstream
ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate. On the other hand, an integrated ﬁrm captures the proﬁto fi t s
downstream aﬃliate (which is πNC < ΠM/N) in the punishment phase, while all unintegrated
upstream ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in the punishment phase, independently of market structure.
This punishment eﬀect increases the integrated ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate, holding ﬁxed its
market share.
Which eﬀect is stronger? Following a single vertical merger, there are M − 1 remaining
unintegrated upstream ﬁrms, and so the combined outlets eﬀect reduces overall deviation proﬁts
by (M − 1)ΠM/N. The punishment eﬀect increases the integrated ﬁrm’s discounted sum of
proﬁts from deviating by δπNC/(1−δ), holding ﬁxed the integrated ﬁrm’s market share. Under
nonintegration, the critical discount factor is b δ
NI
=( M−1)/M. Evaluated at δ = b δ
NI
,h o w e v e r ,
we have δπNC/(1 − δ)=( M − 1)πNC < (M − 1)ΠM/N. Hence, the outlets eﬀect outweighs
the punishment eﬀect since πNC < ΠM/N. This also shows that if ﬁnal goods were completely
independent, and so πNC = ΠM/N, a vertical merger would have no collusive eﬀect.
3.5 Other Collusive Equilibria under Vertical Integration
We have shown that a vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion in the sense that a vertical
merger reduces the critical discount factor above which monopoly proﬁts upstream can be
sustained. One might wonder about the eﬀect of vertical merger on upstream ﬁrms’ ability to
sustain proﬁts above non-cooperative levels but still less than those associated with monopoly
prices. In this subsection we argue that vertical integration merger facilitates upstream collusion
in a broader sense, and that this should be of concern for anti-trust authorities.
Why might ﬁrms wish to sustain outcomes which are less collusive than monopoly? There
are two reasons why such collusion schemes might be attractive. First, it may be that the
monopoly outcome itself is not feasible, and second, it may be that whilst the monopoly outcome
is feasible, the division of the pie required to sustain the monopoly outcome is not favorable for
some particular ﬁrm(s). In either case, since this paper is concerned with upstream collusion,
it seems appropriate to focus on equilibria that lie on upstream ﬁrms’ Pareto frontier. We now
deal with each of these concerns in turn.
14First, would vertical merger harm ﬁrms’ ability to sustain lower levels of collusive proﬁt
when monopoly itself is not feasible? The answer to this turns out to be negative. Recall
from lemma 3 that, under non-integration, positive upstream proﬁts are sustainable if and
only if monopoly proﬁts for upstream ﬁrms are sustainable. Proposition 1 then implies that,
holding the discount factor ﬁxed, any aggregate level of upstream proﬁtt h a tc a nb es u s t a i n e d
under non-integration can also be sustained under vertical integration. Further, there is a range
of discount factors for which collusive proﬁts upstream can be sustained only if one upstream-
downstream pair is vertically integrated. Note in addition that this range is larger than it would
appear from a comparison of lemmas 3 and 4 since (unlike in the unintegrated case) when one
upstream-downstream pair is vertically integrated, the feasibility of collusion does not have the
same all-or-nothing feature that it has in the absence of vertical integration. It may be possible
to sustain positive proﬁt levels when the discount factor is too low for monopoly outcomes
to be feasible. (We give an example of this below.) Thus, vertical integration also facilitates
sustaining “imperfect collusion”: it becomes possible to sustain positive proﬁts below monopoly
level even when the monopoly outcome itself is not sustainable, which was not feasible without
integration.
Now let us turn to the second concern — the idea that, when monopoly outcomes are sus-
tainable, ﬁrms might nevertheless prefer to implement some other collusive scheme. Clearly,
for the reasons noted above, this is not a concern in the unintegrated case. For the case when
one ﬁrm is integrated, one can also show that if it is sustainable, any equilibrium that involves
monopoly proﬁts upstream is better from the unintegrated upstream ﬁrms’ point of view than
o n et h a td o e sn o t .T h eintegrated U1-D1, however, may be better oﬀ in an equilibrium in which
upstream industry proﬁts are less than ΠM. To see this, consider the thought experiment of
increasing each unintegrated Dj’s price from pM to p0 >p M (or reducing Dj’s quantity from
qM to q0 <q M), which amounts to increasing the market share of the integrated D1.W h i l e
this reduces the industry proﬁt, it strengthens the outlets eﬀect in the sense that the fraction
of the industry proﬁt that a deviant unintegrated upstream ﬁrm can capture is now reduced to
less than (N − 1)/N. Hence, the integrated U1-D1 may be better oﬀ s i n c ei tm a yb ea b l et o
obtain a larger share of the (albeit smaller) collusive pie.
This point can best be seen by considering the extreme case when ﬁnal goods are almost
perfect substitutes. If each unintegrated Dj sets pj = ∞ (or qj =0 ), while the integrated
D1 sets p1 =a r gm a x p pQ(p;∞,...,∞) (or q1 =a r gm a x q qP(q;0,...,0)), the deviation proﬁto f
any unintegrated upstream ﬁrm is now zero (due to the outlets eﬀect), and so it is possible
to sustain a collusive equilibrium in which the integrated U1-D1 captures the entire industry
proﬁt. If ﬁnal goods are close substitutes, U1-D1 will thus be able to obtain a collusive proﬁt
close to ΠM, which is more than what it would be able to capture if the monopoly outcome were
sustained. Observe that this asymmetric market outcome — with proﬁts for the integrated U1-
D1 exceeding πNC — can be sustained for any discount factor δ ≥ 0. This is a static equilibrium
of the “coordination failure” type mentioned above.
To summarize the discussion so far, the collusive outcome we have focused on is the preferred
one for unintegrated ﬁrms independently of market structure, but is not necessarily the best
equilibrium for the integrated ﬁrm. Does this reduce the relevance of our analysis? Obviously
not to the extent that it is the preferences of the unintegrated ﬁrms that prevail when the
collusive “agreement” is made.21 But we argue that even to the extent that the selected collu-
21Non-cooperative game theory has very little to say about how the collusive surplus should be divided, as
15sive equilibrium is an asymmetric one favored by the integrated ﬁrm, the anti-trust regulator
should be very concerned about vertical merger in this context, because welfare (as measured
by total surplus) will tend to be lower in such an asymmetric collusive equilibrium than under
monopoly. Given that ﬁnal goods are symmetrically diﬀerentiated, any asymmetry in retail
pricing introduces an additional eﬃciency loss. So when both are feasible, collusion under a
vertically integrated structure may be worse than collusion under an unintegrated structure,
because, other things equal, the former is more likely to be asymmetric. We verify that this is
indeed the case for our linear demand example.
Example 2 (Linear Demand) Suppose there are two upstream and two downstream ﬁrms,
M = N =2 , downstream competition is in prices, and one upstream-downstream pair, say U1-
D1, is vertically integrated. It can be shown that if monopoly proﬁts upstream are sustainable,
then in any equilibrium on upstream ﬁrms’ Pareto frontier, total surplus is less than or equal
to total surplus under monopoly. For instance, consider the equilibrium that maximizes the
integrated U1-D1’s proﬁt. If ﬁnal goods are suﬃciently good substitutes, σ ≥ σ ≡ 2δ/(1 + δ),
then p1 = pM and p2 = ∞; obviously, welfare is lower than under monopoly. Otherwise, if
σ<σ,t h e np1 <p M <p 2, and demand is such that q1 + q2 < 2qM = QM; again, total surplus
is lower than under monopoly.22
Thus vertical merger facilitates not only the maintenance of monopoly prices, but also the
maintenance of lower levels of collusive proﬁts. Moreover, when collusion is sustainable even
in the absence of integration, vertical integration may result in the adoption of an asymmetric
market structure which has lower total surplus than the monopoly outcome.
3.6 Incentives for Vertical Mergers
According to the Chicago School of anti-trust, ﬁrms have no (strict) incentive to vertically
integrate if there are no eﬃciency gains from doing so. In our model, a vertical merger has
no direct eﬃciency eﬀects. In the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium, ﬁrms have therefore no
incentive to vertically merge: the joint proﬁt of any upstream-downstream pair in the sym-
metric noncollusive equilibrium is πNC, independently of whether or not the pair is vertically
integrated. Nevertheless, in our model, an upstream-downstream pair has two distinct (but
related) motives to vertically merge: a collusive motive and a market share motive. To see this,
let us assume that upstream ﬁrms collude whenever feasible.
The collusive motive for vertical merger arises since upstream collusion may be sustainable





, upstream collusion is not sustainable under nonintegration, while monopoly
proﬁts upstream can be sustained under (single) vertical integration. Consider an arbitrary
upstream-downstream pair. Under nonintegration, the joint per-period proﬁt of the pair is only




. Under vertical integration, however, the integrated ﬁrm must obtain a
larger per-period proﬁt to permit upstream collusion, namely αΠM ≥ (1−δ)ΠM+δπNC >π NC,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the integrated ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (3). The pair
can merge and increase all upstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts by making collusion sustainable where it was
not before.
long as all incentive constraints are satisﬁed, and this large research question is outside the scope of this paper.
22Details are available from the authors upon request.
16The market share motive for vertical merger arises since a vertically integrated ﬁrm may
require a larger share of the collusive pie than an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm for upstream
collusion to be sustainable. Suppose δ ≥ b δ
NI
, and upstream ﬁrms jointly extract the monopoly
proﬁt. Then, under nonintegration, there is at least one upstream-downstream pair with a
per-period proﬁtn o tl a r g e rt h a nΠM/M. By vertically integrating, however, the upstream-
downstream pair can ensure itself a collusive per-period proﬁto fa tl e a s tαΠM ≥ (1 − δ)ΠM +
δπNC since, otherwise, the integrated ﬁrm would have an incentive to cheat. Other ﬁrms must
“concede” this increase in market share for collusion not to break down. Vertical integration






≡ δ.I tc a ne a s i l yb ev e r i ﬁed that δ>b δ
NI
if πNC > 0. Hence,
if b δ
NI
≤ δ<δ, a vertically integrated upstream-downstream pair must obtain a larger share of
the collusive proﬁt for upstream collusion to be sustainable, and this pair has a market share
motive for vertical merger.
3.7 Multiple Integrations
We have shown above that vertical integration by a single upstream-downstream pair facilitates
upstream collusion relative to the case where no ﬁrm is vertically integrated. Do further inte-
grations also facilitate collusion? To address this question, we take the same model as before
but now suppose that K ≤ min{M,N} upstream-downstream pairs (say, U1-D1 to UK-DK)
are vertically integrated. Contract oﬀers and downstream prices/quantities along the collusive
equilibrium path are as outlined above for the case of single vertical integration.
Consider ﬁrst the incentives to deviate for an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm Ui, i ≥ K +1 .
Along the collusive equilibrium path, each unintegrated upstream ﬁrm obtains a share (1 −
α)/(M − K) of the monopoly proﬁt, where α is again part of the equilibrium description (and
w i l lg e n e r a l l yd e p e n do nt h en u m b e rK of vertically integrated ﬁrms). By slightly undercutting
its upstream rivals’ contract oﬀers to unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, a deviant Ui can obtain
the business of all unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, and thereby make a proﬁto fΠM/N on each
of the N − K unintegrated downstream ﬁrms. For the reasons discussed above, however, the
unintegrated Uicannot make a proﬁtb yo ﬀering a deviant contract to an integrated downstream
ﬁrm: given that collusion will break down anyway, an integrated downstream ﬁrm would rather
order the intermediate good from its own upstream aﬃliate. Hence, there is an outlets eﬀect
associated with each vertical integration, and this outlets eﬀect reduces the incentives to cheat
for unintegrated upstream ﬁrms. The incentive constraint for an unintegrated Ui can therefore
be written as:
(1 − α)ΠM







Consider now the incentives to deviate for an integrated ﬁrm. To minimize the critical
discount factor, each vertically integrated ﬁrm should obtain the same share, α/K, of monopoly
proﬁts. If K>1, a deviant integrated ﬁrm Ui-Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, can no longer obtain the
monopoly proﬁt by undercutting its rivals’ contract oﬀers since any deviant contract oﬀer to
an integrated rival’s downstream aﬃliate would be rejected. The deviant Ui-Di can, however,
obtain the business of all of the N − K unintegrated downstream ﬁrms. In addition, if K>1,
it will be optimal for Ui-Di to deviate not only by changing the contract oﬀers to unintegrated
downstream ﬁrms but also by lowering its downstream price pi (or increasing its output qi).
17Formally, let πdev
int(K) denote the deviation proﬁt of an integrated Ui-Di when K ﬁrms are
vertically integrated. If downstream competition is in prices,23
πdev
int(K)=m a x
p pD(p;pM,...,p M)+( N − K)pMD(pM;p,pM,...,p M), (6)
where the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. denotes the proﬁt the integrated Ui-Di can make through its
own downstream aﬃl i a t ei fi tc h a r g e sap r i c eo fp, and the second term denotes the rents that
Ui-Di can extract from the N −K unintegrated downstream ﬁrms by oﬀering, say, the contract
(0,p MD(pM;p,pM,...,p M) − ε), with ε being arbitrarily small, to each one of them. It can
easily be veriﬁed that it is optimal for each one of the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms to accept
this contract, independently of the acceptance decisions of the other downstream ﬁrms. Let
pdev
int(K) denote the optimal downstream price that Ui-Di will charge in the period of deviation.





int(K),p M,...,p M) < 0.
Hence, any further vertical integration reduces the deviation proﬁt of an already integrated ﬁrm.
This is again due to the outlets eﬀect. As before, there is a counteracting punishment eﬀect
associated with each vertical integration: when ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated, an integrated ﬁrm
makes a positive proﬁt in the punishment phase. The integrated Ui-Di’s incentive constraint








Does the outlets eﬀect outweigh the punishment eﬀect for each vertical integration? The
answer is, not necessarily. First, note that while the punishment eﬀect is the same size as before,
the outlets eﬀect is smaller for an integrated ﬁrm than for an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm since
the former can increase its deviation proﬁt by changing its own downstream price. Second,
while the vertical merger between UK and DK, K>1, reduces the incentives to cheat for
the ﬁrst K −1 integrated ﬁrms, U1-D1 to U(K −1)-D(K −1),i tincreases UK’s proﬁti nt h e
period of deviation. Eﬀectively this is because by integrating UK can coordinate its upstream
deviation with a downstream price reduction, which it could not before. For the ﬁrst vertical
merger, this coordination was not necessary and the eﬀect did not occur: the deviation proﬁt
of an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm under non-integration is the same as that of the integrated
U1-D1 under single integration, namely ΠM.B u tw i t hK − 1 vertically integrated ﬁrms, the
deviation proﬁt of the unintegrated UK is (N−K+1)ΠM/N, which is less than UK’s deviation
proﬁt after integration, πdev
int(K).24
Summing up the incentive constraints for the unintegrated and integrated upstream ﬁrms,
(5) and (7), we obtain that monopoly proﬁts can be sustained in equilibrium if
δ ≥ b δ(K) ≡








23If downstream competition is in quantities, the expression is analogous.
24To see this, note that the integrated UK-DK can always deviate by not changing its own downstream aﬃl-
iate’s price. This would result in the same deviation proﬁta sUK’s deviation proﬁt prior to vertical integration,
(N − K +1 ) Π
M/N. However, if K>1, it will always be optimal for the integrated UK-DK to set pK below
the monopoly price p
M,a n ds oπ
dev
int(K) > (N − K +1 ) Π
M/N.
18It is instructive to consider some limiting cases. First, suppose ﬁnal goods are almost perfect
substitutes and downstream competition is in prices, and so πNC ≈ 0 and πdev
int(K) ≈ ΠM.I n
this case, the critical discount factor becomesb δ(K) ≈
£






which is minimized at K = M/2, i.e., when half of the upstream ﬁrms are vertically integrated.25
Second, consider the thought experiment of increasing the number M of upstream ﬁrms,
holding ﬁxed the number N of downstream ﬁrms. Then, for M suﬃciently large, the critical
discount factor is minimized when each downstream ﬁrm is vertically integrated with an up-









< 1, independently of M.
Example 3 (Linear Demand) Suppose there are two downstream ﬁrms, N =2 , and down-
stream competition is in prices. Then, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, σ<−1+
√
3,
the second vertical integration further reduces the critical discount factor if there are at least
three upstream ﬁrms, M ≥ 3. If products are suﬃciently close substitutes, σ ≥− 1+
√
3,t h e
second vertical integration further reduces the critical discount factor if there are at least four
upstream ﬁrms, M ≥ 4.
When considering the number K of vertical integrations that one would expect to see in an
industry, one should keep in mind that, in addition to the collusive motive,t h e r ei samarket
share motive for vertical merger. One might expect to see more mergers than the number which
minimizes the critical discount factor as ﬁrms may have an incentive to vertically integrate in
order to obtain a larger share of the collusive pie, even when the vertical merger increases
the critical discount factor. Nevertheless the results in this section are interesting in that they
suggest a reason why we might see an intermediate degree of vertical integration with apparently
symmetric ﬁrms making asymmetric integration choices. Vertical merger may appear to increase
market share, but that does not imply that all ﬁrms in the industry should integrate as this
could upset the collusive equilibrium.
4 Robustness and Extensions
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to the use of optimal punishment
schemes; the secrecy of upstream oﬀers; and the timing of upstream oﬀers and downstream
pricing decisions. We show that our key result — that vertical merger facilitates collusion — is
robust to these changes.
4.1 Optimal Punishment
In our analysis, we have assumed throughout that, in the collusive equilibrium, a deviation by
an upstream ﬁrm triggers an inﬁnite reversion to a noncollusive equilibrium in all subsequent
periods. This may, however, not be the worst possible punishment that can be inﬂicted on
the deviator. In the existing literature on collusion, which has focused on repeated normal-
form games, inﬂicting the worst possible punishment on a deviator consists in playing, from
25At the other extreme, if ﬁnal goods were completely independent of one another (i.e., if each downstream




int(K)=( N − K +1 ) Π
M/N.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e c r i t i c a l
discount factor e δ(K) would be independent of the number of vertical mergers.
19the following period onward, the subgame-perfect equilibrium that yields the lowest payoﬀ to
the deviator. In the context of our model, a deviating unintegrated upstream ﬁrm cannot be
punished any more harshly than by reversion to the noncollusive equilibrium where it receives
zero proﬁts. But it may be feasible to sustain a per-period payoﬀ for an integrated upstream-
downstream pair that is less than the noncollusive proﬁt πNC. If so, this would further reduce
the critical discount factor under vertical integration, and only strengthen our main result
(proposition 1) that (single) vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion by reducing the
size of the punishment eﬀect.
However, our model is a repeated extensive-form game, in which it may be possible to
use within-period punishment. In repeated extensive-form games, inﬂicting the lowest feasible
payoﬀ in all future periods does not generally constitute the worst possible punishment for a
deviator. For instance, in our model, an upstream ﬁrm can proﬁtably deviate only if at least
one downstream ﬁrm accepts the deviant oﬀer. An optimal punishment scheme may therefore
provide incentives for downstream ﬁrms to reject deviant oﬀers. Studying optimal punishment
schemes in general is beyond the scope of this paper, but we are able to do so for the case where
ﬁnal goods are homogeneous.
In this section, we consider the optimal punishment scheme for the case when downstream
ﬁrms produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good and compete in either prices or quantities. The section
has two aims. First, we show that our conclusion — that a vertical merger between an upstream
and a downstream ﬁrm facilitates upstream collusion — continues to hold under the optimal
punishment scheme. Second, not much is known about optimal punishment in repeated ex-
tensive-form (rather than normal-form) games, and so the punishment scheme we derive is of
independent interest. Indeed, we show that the logic of simple penal codes (Abreu (1988)) breaks
down in our repeated-extensive form game: upstream collusion may be sustainable only under a
strategy proﬁle with the property that the continuation play after an upstream ﬁrm’s deviation
depends not only on the identity of the deviator, but also on the details of the deviation.
We assume that there is a public randomization device not only at the beginning of the
acceptance stage (so as to allow an optimal sharing of collusive proﬁts between upstream ﬁrms)
as before, but also at the beginning of each period (so as to allow coordination on a particular
equilibrium of the stage game). For simplicity, we will conﬁne attention to the case of two
downstream ﬁrms, N =2 . But it should be clear from our discussion below that the qualitative
features of our results do not depend on this restriction.
Asymmetric Noncollusive Equilibria. In addition to the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium,
there exist asymmetric subgame-perfect equilibria of the stage game. Indeed, as we have already
shown above for the case of single vertical integration, there exists an equilibrium of the stage
game, where the integrated ﬁrm obtains all of the monopoly rents (see lemma 5). Asymmetric
equilibria of the stage game also exist when no ﬁrm is vertically integrated. In this case,
for any downstream ﬁrm Dj, there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game,
denoted b σj,w h e r eDj receives the monopoly proﬁt ΠM,w h i l ea l lo t h e rﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
Furthermore, when no ﬁrm is vertically integrated, there exists an equilibrium of the stage
game, denoted b σ0, in which all upstream and downstream ﬁrms make zero proﬁts: under price
competition this is the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium; under quantity competition, this
equilibrium is generated by a “coordination failure” between the quantity choices of and oﬀers
to the downstream ﬁrms.
20Lemma 6 Suppose ﬁnal goods are homogeneous and no ﬁrm is vertically integrated. Then,
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game, denoted b σj, in which an (arbitrary)
downstream ﬁrm Dj captures all of the monopoly rents ΠM. Moreover, there exists a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the stage game, denoted b σ0, in which industry proﬁts are zero.
As we will now show, the asymmetric noncollusive equilibria are used in the optimal pun-
ishment scheme for rewarding those downstream ﬁrms that have rejected deviant oﬀers, and
the zero-proﬁt equilibrium b σ0 for punishing downstream ﬁrms in the event where all of them
have accepted deviant oﬀers.
Collusive Equilibrium: Non-Integration. We now derive the optimal collusive scheme under
non-integration, which diﬀers from the collusive strategy proﬁl ed e s c r i b e db e f o r eo n l yi nt h e
subgames following a deviation by an upstream ﬁrm. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the
case where each of the two unintegrated downstream ﬁrms sells half of the monopoly output
along the collusive equilibrium path (i.e., each downstream ﬁrm sets a quantity of QM/2,o r
charges a price of pM and consumer demand is divided equally between the two retailers). Of
course, the strategy proﬁle will prescribe asymmetric downstream behavior in certain subgames
oﬀ the equilibrium path.
The worst possible punishment that might be inﬂicted upon a deviant upstream ﬁrm is
that— in addition to the play of one of the noncollusive equilibria in all future periods — all of its
deviant contracts are rejected by the downstream ﬁrms in the period of deviation, leaving the
unintegrated upstream ﬁrm with a deviation proﬁt of zero. By playing one of the asymmetric
noncollusive equilibria, b σ1 and b σ2, in all future periods, the maximum joint “reward” R that





For downstream ﬁrm Dj to accept upstream ﬁrm Ui’s deviant oﬀer (w0
ij,F0
ij), the deviator
needs to leave rents to Dj, in the form of a reduced wholesale price and/or a reduced ﬁxed fee.
Let






denote Ui’s “bribe” to downstream ﬁrm Dj.
An important feature of the optimal punishment scheme (discussed further below) is that
downstream ﬁrm Dj’s reward for rejecting upstream ﬁrm Ui’s deviant oﬀer (and accepting
the equilibrium contract oﬀered by a nondeviant upstream ﬁrm) depends on the bribes bi1
and bi2 oﬀered by Ui, and on both downstream ﬁrms’ acceptance decisions.26 Speciﬁcally,
the optimal punishment scheme is of the following form. Case (i): Suppose the bribes satisfy
max{bi1bi2} ≤ ΠM/2. (a) If only one downstream ﬁrm, say Dj, rejects Ui’s oﬀer, then Dj
receives the maximum reward R. That is, the asymmetric equilibrium b σj will be played in all
future periods. (b) If both downstream ﬁrms reject the deviant oﬀers, then D1 receives a fraction
γi1 ∈ [0,1] of the maximum reward R,a n dD2 receives the remaining fraction γi2 =1− γi1,








i2) (in addition to
downstream ﬁrms’ acceptance decisions). But since downstream ﬁrms’ prices/quantities are set at the same time
as upstream ﬁrms’ oﬀers are made, what matters for downstream ﬁrms’ incentives are not the oﬀered wholesale
prices and ﬁxed fees per se but the induced bribes bi1 and bi2.
21where γij will be chosen optimally as a function of bi1 and bi2. That is, in any future period,
the asymmetric equilibrium b σj, j =1 ,2, will be played with probability γij (using the public
randomization device at the beginning of each period). (c) If both downstream ﬁrms accept
the deviant oﬀers, then the zero-proﬁt equilibrium b σ0 will be played in all future periods. Case
(ii): Suppose the bribes satisfy bij < ΠM/2 <b ik. In this case, the deviant Ui would make
al o s so ni t so ﬀer to Dk,a n ds oDk should not be rewarded for rejecting Ui’s oﬀer. Instead,
downstream ﬁrm Dj will receive the maximum reward R for rejecting Ui’s oﬀer, independently
of Dk’s acceptance decision. Case (iii): Suppose the bribes satisfy min{bi1,b i2} >R .I nt h i s
case, the deviant Ui will make a loss on each contract if accepted, and so no downstream ﬁrm
will be oﬀered a reward for rejecting the oﬀer. (The strategy proﬁle may prescribe, for example,
the play of the zero-proﬁt equilibrium b σ0 in all future periods.)
Clearly, it will never be optimal for Ui to oﬀer a bribe bij > ΠM/2, and so we will from
now on conﬁne attention to case (i) where bij ≤ ΠM/2 for each j =1 ,2. Observe that the
optimal punishment scheme is such that whenever a downstream ﬁrm accepts a deviant oﬀer,
it will receive zero proﬁts in all future periods. Consequently, Dj will accept Ui’s deviant oﬀer
if and only if the oﬀered bribe bij exceeds Dj’s expected reward for rejecting Ui’s oﬀer. We
now derive the optimal “choice” of γij as a function of the oﬀered bribes bi1 and bi2.
First, suppose that Uideviates by oﬀering bribes bi1 >Rand bi2 >R . In this case, even the
maximum feasible reward R is insuﬃcient to prevent any one downstream ﬁrm from accepting
the deviant oﬀer. Equilibrium thus prescribes that both downstream ﬁrms accept Ui’s oﬀers,
independently of the value of γij,a n dUi’s deviation proﬁti sΠM−(bi1+bi2). Hence, conditional
on oﬀering such bribes, Uican obtain a maximum deviation proﬁt of (approximately) ΠM −2R
by setting bi1 = bi2 = R + ε with ε being arbitrarily small.
Second, suppose that Ui deviates by oﬀering bribes 0 <b ij ≤ R and bik ≥ R.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the available rewards are insuﬃcient to induce both downstream ﬁrms to reject the Ui’s oﬀer; in
fact, if bik >R , downstream ﬁrm Dk would accept Ui’s oﬀer even if oﬀered the maximum reward
R. The optimal punishment therefore involves setting γij =1 , which induces downstream ﬁrm
Dj to reject Ui’s oﬀer (and instead to accept the equilibrium contract (wM,FM) oﬀered by
a nondeviant upstream ﬁrm). The strategy proﬁle then prescribes that Dj accepts and Dk
rejects the deviant oﬀer, and Ui’s deviation proﬁti sΠM/2−bik. Hence, conditional on oﬀering
such bribes, Ui can obtain a maximum deviation proﬁto fΠM/2−R by setting bij ∈ (0,R] and
bik = R.
Third, suppose that Ui deviates by oﬀering bribes bi1 ≤ R and bi2 ≤ R with bi1 + bi2 ≤ R.
In this case, both downstream ﬁrms can be induced to reject Ui’s deviant oﬀer (and accept the
equilibrium contract oﬀered by a nondeviant upstream ﬁrm) by setting γij = bij/(bi1 + bi2).
Hence, by oﬀering such bribes, Ui’s deviation proﬁti sz e r o .
Fourth, suppose that Ui deviates by oﬀering bribes bi1 <Rand bi2 <Rwith bi1 +bi2 >R .
(Given that bi1,bi2 ≤ ΠM/2, this case can arise only if R<ΠM,o rδ<1/2.) In this case, the
feasible rewards are insuﬃcient to induce both downstream ﬁrms to reject Ui’s oﬀers for sure.
B u ti ti sp o s s i b l et oo ﬀer rewards such that one downstream ﬁrm will reject for sure, or else
that each downstream ﬁrm will reject with positive probability. By setting γij =1 ,d o w n s t r e a m
ﬁrm Dj can be induced to reject (and its rival Dk to accept) Ui’s oﬀer for sure. Alternatively,
if 0 ≤ γi1 <b i1 and 0 ≤ γi2 <b i2 (with γi1 + γi1 =1 ), there is a multiplicity of equilibria at
the acceptance stage: (i) two pure-strategy equilibria where Dj accepts Ui’s contract, while
Dk rejects it, and Ui’s deviation proﬁti sΠM/2 − bij, and (ii) a mixed-strategy equilibrium
22where each downstream ﬁrm accepts with positive probability. The collusive strategy proﬁle
prescribes that the worst equilibrium from the deviant Ui’s point of view will be played: as we
will now show, this is the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 7 Suppose upstream ﬁrm Ui deviates by oﬀering a weakly larger bribe to Dj than to
Dk, bik ≤ bij < min{R,ΠM/2},a n dbi1 + bi2 >R . (The restrictions imply R<ΠM, i.e.,
δ<1/2.) Then, the optimal punishment scheme is such that γij = bij/R and γik =1− bij/R.
The strategy proﬁle prescribes that Dk rejects Ui’s oﬀer with probability one and that Dj rejects
the deviant oﬀer with probability (R−bik)/bij. Conditional on oﬀering such bribes, Ui’s optimal
deviation consists in setting


























When it is infeasible to induce both downstream ﬁrms to reject the deviant oﬀer with
probability one, the optimal punishment scheme provides rewards in such a way to permit
“miscoordination” between downstream ﬁrms at the acceptance stage. To see why such mis-
coordination is detrimental for the proﬁts of the deviant upstream ﬁrm, suppose Ui oﬀers
bribes bi1 = bi2 =( 1+ε)R/2 < ΠM/2,w h e r eε is small. The worst possible punishment
involving a pure-strategy equilibrium at the acceptance stage is such that one downstream
ﬁrm, say Dk, rejects the oﬀer, while its downstream rival Dj accepts it. (This holds for any
choice of 0 ≤ γi1 =1− γi2 ≤ 1.) The resulting deviation proﬁti s
£
ΠM − (1 + ε)R
¤
/2.H o w -
ever, if γij =( 1+ε)/2 and γik =( 1− ε)/2, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium at the
acceptance stage where downstream ﬁrm Dk rejects the deviant oﬀer for sure, while Dj ran-
domizes and accepts the deviant oﬀer with probability 2ε/(1 + ε). Ui’s deviation proﬁti so n l y £
ΠM − (1 + ε)R
¤
ε/(1 + ε), which is close to zero for ε small.
To summarize, by optimally choosing the bribes bi1 and bi2, upstream ﬁrm Ui can get a
maximum deviation proﬁto f
πdev











































where the arguments are listed in the order of our discussion above. (As regards the ﬁnal
argument, the maximum-term reﬂects that this fourth case can arise only if R<ΠM,o r





We obtain the following result.
23Lemma 8 Suppose no ﬁrm is vertically integrated. Then, under the optimal punishment scheme,










2M if M ≥ 13.
Comparing the critical discount factor under “Nash reversion” from lemma 3, b δ
NI
,w i t ht h a t
under the optimal punishment scheme, b δ
NI
optimal, we observe that the former goes to one as the
number of upstream ﬁrms becomes large, b δ
NI
→ 1 as M →∞ , while the latter is bounded from
above by 1/2, b δ
NI
optimal → 1/2 as M →∞ . Under the optimal punishment scheme, the more
patient are players (or the less frequent prices can be adjusted), the greater is the present value
of future rewards. If δ ≥ 1/2, there exists a division of these future rewards and an equilibrium
at the acceptance stage such that an upstream ﬁrm’s maximum deviation proﬁt is actually zero.
In the foregoing analysis, we have derived the critical discount factor assuming that each
downstream ﬁrm produces one half of the monopoly output along the collusive equilibrium
path. Intuitively, this arrangement facilitates upstream collusion: downstream asymmetries
would make upstream collusion more diﬃcult. To see this, suppose one downstream ﬁrm, say
Dj, were to produce the whole monopoly output in the collusive equilibrium. Then, a deviant
Ui would need to oﬀer a bribe of only bij = R + ε (with ε being arbitrarily small) to that
downstream ﬁrm Dj, and obtain a deviation proﬁto f( a l m o s t )ΠM − R. The resulting critical
discount factor would be (M −1)/(2M), which is clearly larger than the one when downstream
ﬁrms share the market symmetrically.
The existing literature on collusion has focused almost exclusively on repeated normal-form
games. As Abreu (1988) has shown, when deriving the optimal punishment scheme in such
games, one can conﬁne attention to simple penal codes. Any subgame-perfect outcome can be
supported by a proﬁle with the property that any deviation by a player from the current pre-
scribed path is punished by the same punishment path (penal code). That is, the continuation
play after a deviation by a player is independent of the details of the deviation, depending only
on the identity of the deviator.
The optimal punishment scheme derived above is not a simple penal code. First, depending
on the deviant upstream ﬁrm’s contract oﬀers, the strategy proﬁle prescribes that diﬀerent
downstream ﬁrms reject the oﬀers, and the associated “rewards” mean that diﬀerent outcome
paths are played in future periods. For example, suppose that the deviant Ui oﬀers bribes
bi1 = bi2 = R/2 < ΠM/2. Then, the strategy proﬁle prescribes that both downstream ﬁrms
reject the oﬀer, and that in all future periods each o n eo ft h et w oa s y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i a ,b σ1
and b σ2,i sp l a y e dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1/2. In contrast, suppose that Uioﬀers bribes bi1 = R<b i2.
In this case, the strategy proﬁle prescribes that D1 rejects Ui’s oﬀer (and that D2 accepts the
oﬀer), and that in all future periods, the asymmetric equilibrium b σ1 is played with probability
one. Hence, the prescribed outcome path in all future periods depends on the details of Ui’s
deviant contract oﬀers. Second, even in the event when both downstream ﬁrms reject Ui’s
deviant oﬀers, the continuation play optimally depends on the details of these oﬀers. Indeed, as
lemma 7 shows, when the oﬀered bribes satisfy bi1 ≤ bi2 <Rand bi1+bi2 >R , downstream ﬁrm
D2 should obtain a fraction bi2/R of the total reward R (and D1 the remaining fraction) when
both D1 and D2 reject Ui’s oﬀer. Hence, the probability distribution over the two asymmetric
24equilibria, b σ1 and b σ2, in all future periods depends on the details of Ui’s contract oﬀers, even
after both downstream ﬁrms have taken the same action at the acceptance stage.
Our results show that the logic of simple penal codes breaks down in repeated extensive-
form games. In our model, upstream collusion may be sustainable only under a strategy proﬁle
with the property that the prescribed continuation play following a deviation not only depends
on the identity of the deviant upstream ﬁrm, but also on the details of its contract oﬀers.27
Proposition 2 Under non-integration, the optimal punishment scheme is not a simple penal
code.
Collusive Equilibrium: Single Integration. Suppose now that one upstream-downstream pair
is vertically integrated. As we have already shown in lemma 5, monopoly proﬁts upstream are
then sustainable for any discount factor δ ≥ 0. Hence, the conclusion of proposition 1 still holds
under the optimal punishment scheme.
Proposition 3 Suppose ﬁnal goods are homogeneous. Under the optimal punishment scheme,
(single) vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion.
4.2 Secret Oﬀers
While it is very natural to assume that downstream ﬁrms’ retail prices are publicly observed
(indeed, in most retail markets, prices are publicly posted), the details of a contract between an
upstream and a downstream ﬁrm may not be easily veriﬁed by other ﬁrms. In this subsection,
we will assume that only the downstream prices are publicly observed at the pricing stage, while
upstream ﬁrm Ui’s contract oﬀer (wij,F ij) to downstream ﬁrm Dj is private information to Ui
and Dj. As we will show, the main conclusion of our paper is robust: even when contracts are
secret, a (single) vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion.
To simplify the analysis, we will continue to assume that there is a publicly observed ran-
domization device (so as to allow ﬁrms to share the market in an arbitrary way).28 We will
also assume that all contract oﬀers (and acceptance decisions) are publicly revealed at the end
of each period (after proﬁts are realized).
At the acceptance stage, each downstream ﬁrm Dj must form beliefs about the secret
contract oﬀers to its downstream rivals. In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, these beliefs are
pinned down by equilibrium play. However, if an integrated upstream-downstream pair, say
U1-D1, deviates from equilibrium by charging a diﬀerent retail price (or by setting a diﬀerent
quantity) — which is publicly observed — then, at the acceptance stage, each downstream ﬁrm
Dj, j>1, may hold arbitrary beliefs about the contracts that the deviant integrated ﬁrm has
oﬀered to any rival downstream ﬁrm Di, i>1, i 6= j.29 Similarly, if upstream ﬁrm Ui deviates
by oﬀe r i n gad i ﬀerent contract to downstream ﬁrm Dj, then perfect Bayesian equilibrium does
not pin down Dj’s beliefs about Ui’s oﬀer to Dk, k 6= j.
27We provide some further discussion of the failure of simple penal codes in a separate note, Mailath, Nocke,
and White (2004).
28Instead of assuming the existence of a public correlating device, we could alternatively allow ﬁrms to share
the collusive proﬁts by making secret side payments at the end of the period, after proﬁts are realized.
29If an unintegrated downstream ﬁrm Dj were to deviate at the pricing stage, then perfect Bayesian equilibrium
implies that, at the acceptance stage, all downstream ﬁrms would continue to believe that their downstream rivals
were oﬀered their equilibrium contracts.
25In the literature on foreclosure and vertical restraints with secret contracts, where this prob-
lem arises, it is customary to impose restrictions on the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs; see
Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), Segal (1999), and Rey and Tirole (2003).
Our assumption that upstream and downstream ﬁrms set oﬀers and prices (quantities) simul-
taneously implies that, unlike most of the literature, we do not need to restrict downstream
ﬁrms’ beliefs in the event that they receive an out-of-equilibrium contract oﬀer from an uninte-
grated upstream ﬁrm, or from the integrated U1-D1 (unless U1-D1 deviates by also changing
p1 or q1). Our model requires us to restrict downstream ﬁrms’ beliefs only for the subgame
in which the integrated ﬁrm, U1-D1, has deviated by changing the price (or quantity) of its
downstream aﬃliate, D1. Having observed such a deviation, we assume that an (unintegrated)
downstream ﬁrm Dj forms wary beliefs (see McAfee and Schwartz (1994)) at the acceptance
stage: Dj believes that the cheating U1-D1’s secret contract oﬀers to the other downstream
ﬁrms maximize U1-D1’s proﬁt, given U1-D1’s oﬀer to Dj. An appealing implication of this
assumption on beliefs is that no downstream ﬁrm will ex post regret accepting an upstream
ﬁrm’s optimal deviation contract, and so an upstream ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt is bounded from
above by the monopoly proﬁt.30
We ﬁrst consider the noncollusive equilibria, i.e., the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the stage
game. It is straightforward to show the following two results. First, lemma 1 carries over to
the case of secret oﬀers: under any market structure, each upstream ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt( o n
its contracts with unintegrated downstream ﬁrms) in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
stage game, independently of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Second, for any set of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, it is possible to sustain the symmetric noncollusive outcome (see lemma 2), where all
upstream ﬁrms oﬀer (0,0) to all (unintegrated) downstream ﬁrms, and each downstream ﬁrm
makes proﬁt πNC ≥ 0. Both claims are based on the observation that, at the acceptance stage,
a downstream ﬁrm observes its downstream rivals’ prices (or quantities), and given these prices,
its proﬁt does not directly depend on its rivals’ contracts.
Consider now the collusive strategy proﬁle where upstream ﬁrms extract all of the monopoly
rents, and any deviation by an upstream ﬁrm or by an integrated upstream-downstream pair is
followed, in all future periods, by the inﬁnite play of the (symmetric) noncollusive equilibrium.
Along the collusive equilibrium path, contract oﬀers and downstream prices (or quantities) are
as in the case of public oﬀers.
We claim that upstream ﬁrms’ deviation proﬁts, and hence incentive constraints, are as in
the case of public oﬀers. The intuition is as follows. Recall that at the acceptance stage each
downstream ﬁrm Dj observes its downstream rivals’ prices/quantities. It then follows that
downstream ﬁrm Dj’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs about the secret oﬀers made by the deviant
Ui t oi t sr i v a l sa ﬀect Dj’s proﬁt only insofar as these secret oﬀers may or may not lead to
Dj’s rivals rejecting all of their oﬀers — since in this case, Dj would face additional demand
30In the above-cited literature, which is concerned only with static models, the restriction of passive beliefs is
often imposed: receiving an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer, a downstream ﬁrm continues to believe that its rivals received
their equilibrium oﬀers. This restriction is typically justiﬁed by the argument that, from the upstream ﬁrm’s
point of view, downstream ﬁrms operate in separate markets. However, in our context of collusion in a repeated
game, this argument no longer holds: conditional on deviating (i.e., conditional on triggering the punishment
phase), it is optimal for the deviant upstream ﬁrm to deviate through each downstream ﬁrm. Under passive
beliefs, an upstream ﬁrm’s maximum deviation proﬁt would be larger than the monopoly proﬁt, and downstream
ﬁrms would ex post regret accepting deviant oﬀers. See also Rey and Tirole (2004) and Rey and Vergé (2004)
for an alternative argument as to why wary beliefs may sometimes be preferred to passive or symmetric beliefs.
26from the rationed consumers. Further, note that if Ui deviates but all retail prices/quantities
remain unchanged (which is necessarily the case if Ui is an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm), then
each downstream ﬁrm would make zero proﬁt by accepting the contract (wM,FM) oﬀered by
Ui’s nondeviant rivals. Hence, as long as downstream prices are unchanged, each Dj will
correctly believe that its downstream rivals’ will not reject all of their oﬀers, and so Dj will not
face additional demand from rationed consumers. When downstream prices remain unchanged,
each Dj is thus willing to accept the same set of deviant contracts as in the case of public oﬀers.
Finally, out-of-equilibrium beliefs matter when the integrated U1-D1 deviates by changing its
downstream price p1 (or quantity q1). In particular, if p1 <p M (or q1 >q M), downstream
ﬁrms would make a loss if all of them were to accept the nondeviant contract (wM,FM).W h a t
our assumption of wary beliefs ensures is that Dj cannot be exploited by falsely believing
that its downstream rivals are rejecting all of their contracts (in which case Dj would face
additional demand from rationed consumers). Since it is in the deviant Ui’s best interest to
deviate through all downstream ﬁrms (conditional on deviating), wary beliefs imply that Dj
will believe that the deviant Ui has made “acceptable” contract oﬀers to its rivals. Hence, Dj
will accept the same set of deviant contract oﬀers as under public oﬀers.
Proposition 4 Under secret oﬀers, a vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream
ﬁrm facilitates upstream collusion.
As should be clear from our discussion above, we could dispense with any restriction on
out-of-equilibrium beliefs — even in the event of a deviation involving the integrated ﬁrm’s
downstream aﬃliate — and still obtain the same result if we were to assume that downstream
ﬁrm Dj’s demand will not increase if its downstream rival Dk r e j e c t sa l lo fi t so ﬀers and is thus
unable to serve its demand.
In our analysis, we have assumed that contract oﬀers become common knowledge at the
end of each period. Would our results still hold if contract oﬀers were never publicly revealed?
For the case of homogeneous ﬁnal goods and price competition downstream, it is possible to
construct a collusive equilibrium in which ﬁrms’ incentive constraints (and the critical discount
factor) are as under public oﬀers. This is brieﬂy described in the appendix. If ﬁnal goods
are diﬀerentiated (or downstream competition is in quantities), however, then it will in general
not be possible for upstream ﬁrms to extract all of the monopoly rents along the collusive
equilibrium path.
4.3 A Model with Sequential Moves
So far, we have assumed that upstream contract oﬀers and downstream retail prices are chosen
simultaneously. In many circumstances, however, it seems plausible that downstream ﬁrms have
contracts with their input suppliers in place before deciding upon their own output prices. In
this section, we analyze the robustness of our predictions to a change in the sequence of moves.
In particular, we assume the following timing in each period:
1. Contract oﬀer stage: Upstream ﬁrms U1,...,UM simultaneously make public two-part
tariﬀ contract oﬀers to the downstream ﬁrms.
272. Acceptance stage: Downstream ﬁrms D1,...,DN simultaneously decide which contract(s)
to accept.31
3. Downstream pricing stage: Downstream ﬁrms D1,...,DN simultaneously set prices (or
quantities) in the retail market, and then order the quantities demanded by consumers
from the upstream ﬁrms at the relevant wholesale prices.32
As before, we will analyze the impact of a single vertical merger on the critical discount factor
above which monopoly proﬁts upstream can be sustained, conﬁning attention to a punishment
scheme that involves inﬁnite reversion to the (symmetric) noncollusive equilibrium.33 Does
vertical integration facilitate upstream collusion when downstream ﬁrms can condition their
retail prices on upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers in this way? It turns out that the outlets and
punishment eﬀects of vertical integration are still present with this modiﬁed timing. In addition,
two new eﬀects arise: the reaction eﬀect and the lack-of-commitment eﬀect. These new eﬀects
arise from the ﬂexibility of the integrated downstream ﬁrm’s price to changes in upstream oﬀers
which results from the new timing. Consider ﬁrst a deviation by an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm,
say, Ui. As before, vertical integration reduces Ui’s deviation proﬁts. The reduction in Ui’s
deviation proﬁts can now be decomposed into two components. First, holding ﬁxed all retail
prices/quantities, the deviant Ui cannot obtain D1’s business. This is the by now familiar
outlets eﬀect. Second, the integrated D1 can react to Ui’s deviation by reducing its retail price
(or increasing its quantity), reducing the sales of the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms accepting
Ui’s oﬀers. The deviant Uimay choose to anticipate this response by selecting a deviation which
will also induce diﬀerent (non-monopoly) choices from the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, but
the net eﬀect of this downstream ﬂexibility is still to reduce Ui’s proﬁtb e l o ww h a ti tw o u l db e
without such ﬂexibility. We will call the impact of this downstream price (quantity) ﬂexibility
on Ui’s deviation proﬁtt h ereaction eﬀect of vertical integration.
Now consider a deviation by the integrated ﬁrm. The ﬂip-side of the reaction eﬀect in
this context is the lack-of-commitment eﬀect.T h i s e ﬀect arises because the integrated ﬁrm’s
downstream aﬃliate can also react to its own upstream aﬃliate’s deviation by changing its
price (or quantity). The integrated ﬁrm’s inability to commit to maintaining a high retail price
(or a low output) when making deviant oﬀers to unintegrated downstream ﬁrms reduces their
willingness to pay and hence the integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt.
As we now show, both the reaction eﬀect and lack of commitment eﬀect reduce deviation
proﬁts and hence make upstream collusion easier to sustain.
Noncollusive Equilibrium. The symmetric noncollusive equilibrium of the stage game in-
volves the same contract oﬀers and downstream prices/quantities along the equilibrium path
as in the base model. In this equilibrium, each upstream ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt, while each
downstream ﬁrm makes proﬁt πNC ≥ 0 (where the inequality is strict unless ﬁnal goods are
homogeneous and downstream competition is in prices), and the equilibrium outcome is again
independent of the number of vertical mergers.
31As in the base model, we assume that either there exists a public randomization device at the beginning of
the acceptance stage, or else upstream ﬁrms can make side payments at the end of each period.
32If downstream ﬁrm Dj has rejected all contract oﬀers at the acceptance stage, it is forced to set pj = ∞ (or
quantity qj =0 ) at the downstream pricing stage, and thus make zero proﬁt.
33Details of the optimal punishment schemes are available from the authors on request. Our results will be
robust to the use of the optimal punishment scheme.
28Lemma 9 Independently of market structure, the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium is a pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game.
Collusive Equilibrium: Non-Integration. Our analysis of the case of non-integration can be
brief as, when no ﬁrm is vertically integrated, the sequential timing does not upset the collusive
equilibrium outcome described in section 3.2. The same upstream contracts will implement the
same monopoly prices (or quantities) downstream, and so each upstream ﬁrm’s expected per-
period proﬁt along the collusive equilibrium path will be ΠM/M. The optimal deviation again
entails slightly undercutting rival oﬀers to obtain (approximately) the monopoly proﬁt ΠM.34
In the ensuing punishment phase, all upstream ﬁrms make zero proﬁts, and so the incentive




Lemma 10 In the model with sequential moves, the critical discount factor (above which up-




Collusive Equilibrium: Single Integration. Let us turn to the collusive equilibrium when
one upstream-downstream pair, say U1-D1, is vertically integrated. Now the ﬂexibility of
downstream pricing (quantity setting) will aﬀect deviation proﬁts. But the collusive outcome
itself will be implemented with the same set of contracts as in section 3.3, yielding monopoly
proﬁts ΠM to be divided among upstream ﬁrms. The market share of the integrated U1-D1
along the collusive equilibrium path is again denoted α, and minimizing the critical discount
factor will again entail the M − 1 unintegrated upstream ﬁrms sharing the remaining proﬁts
equally.35
Consider ﬁrst the incentive to deviate of an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm, Ui, i ≥ 2.A s
in the model with simultaneous moves, the unintegrated Ui w i l ln o tb ea b l et oe x t r a c ta n y
rents from oﬀering a deviant contract to the integrated downstream ﬁrm D1: the integrated
D1 prefers to purchase its inputs from its own upstream aﬃliate U1 (at an eﬀective cost of
34When downstream prices are set after contracts are accepted, it is no longer a dominant strategy for each
downstream ﬁrm to accept the deviant contract. However, it is straightforward to see that the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in this subgame involves each downstream ﬁrm accepting the deviant contract, and setting a
price of (approximately) p
M.
35Suppose integer constraints on the sharing of collusive upstream proﬁts are solved by using a public ran-
domization device at the acceptance stage (rather than through side payments at the end of the period). Then,
it may be optimal for upstream collusion that the integrated U1-D1’s proﬁtb ei n d e p e n d e n to ft h eo u t c o m eo f
the randomization device since, otherwise, we may need to worry about U1-D1’s incentive constraint at the
pricing stage. This can be achieved by prescribing that only a fraction of the integrated D1’s equilibrium output
is ordered from its upstream aﬃliate U1, the remaining units being ordered from other upstream ﬁrms. For
example, suppose M = N =2and α =0 .6. Then, along the collusive equilibrium path, the unintegrated D2
accepts the integrated U1’s contract (w
M,F
M) with probability one, while the integrated D1 accepts a contract
of the form (p
M,0), and orders eighty percent of its equilibrium output q
M = Q
M/2 from the unintegrated U2,
and the remaining twenty percent of its output from its upstream division U1. It can easily be veriﬁed that this
cross-selling arrangement does not aﬀect upstream ﬁrms’ incentives to oﬀer deviant contracts. Alternatively, as
before, the issue can be resolved by using side payments at the end of the period.
29zero). If the integrated U1-D1’s price were ﬁxed at the collusive price pM (or its quantity were
ﬁxed at qM), then the deviant Ui could obtain a deviation proﬁto f(N −1)ΠM/N in the same
way as before, by oﬀering each unintegrated downstream ﬁrm the contract (wM − ε,FM − ε).
This reduction in an upstream ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt is the by now familiar outlets eﬀect of
vertical integration. However, since downstream prices are set after observing upstream ﬁrms’
contract oﬀers, the integrated D1 can change its retail price p1 (or quantity q1)i nr e s p o n s et o
Ui’s deviation. Anticipating this reaction, Ui may choose to make a diﬀerent deviation which
exploits the price ﬂexibility of the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms and induces diﬀerent behavior
from them. The net eﬀect of this price (quantity) adjustment by integrated and unintegrated
downstream ﬁrms is to reduce the deviation proﬁt of the unintegrated Uibeyond what is due to
the outlets eﬀect alone. We call this additional impact the reaction eﬀect of vertical integration.
As before, an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt in the punishment phase. Hence,
the unintegrated Ui’s incentive constraint is given by
(1 − α)ΠM




















unint denotes the maximum deviation proﬁt of an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm. The
following lemma shows that the reaction eﬀect of vertical integration does indeed reduce an
unintegrated upstream ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt.
Lemma 11 An unintegrated upstream ﬁrm’s maximum deviation proﬁt, πdev
unint,s a t i s ﬁes πdev
unint <
(N − 1)ΠM/N.
The lemma follows from two observations. First, since the integrated downstream ﬁrm D1
faces an eﬀective wholesale price of zero (the marginal cost of its upstream division U1), D1
must receive a share of at least 1/N of industry proﬁts when an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm Ui
deviates, and the deviant Uiw i l ln o tb ea b l et oe x t r a c tD1’s proﬁt. Second, the industry proﬁt
when Ui deviates will be less than the monopoly proﬁt since the integrated D1 will choose its
myopic best response to the other retail prices/quantities.
Let us now turn to the integrated U1-D1’s incentives to deviate. The integrated ﬁrm can no
longer obtain the business of the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms simply by slightly undercut-
ting its upstream rivals’ contract oﬀers (unless ﬁnal goods are homogeneous and downstream
competition is in prices). The reason is as follows. After it has made deviant oﬀers to the
unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, U1-D1 will at the downstream pricing stage set the price p1
(or quantity q1) that maximizes the integrated U1-D1’s deviation proﬁt. To the extent that
the wholesale price oﬀered by U1-D1 is less than the monopoly price pM (which it must be if
goods are diﬀerentiated or competition is in quantities) the integrated ﬁrm will optimally set
a retail price below pM (or a quantity above qM). Of course, this will be anticipated by the
unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, which will therefore reject any oﬀer with a “high” ﬁxed fee.
Indeed, as we will show below, the integrated ﬁrm’s maximum deviation proﬁt, πdev
int,w i l lb el e s s
than the monopoly proﬁt ΠM if ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated. We will refer to this reduction in
U1’s deviation proﬁt — as a result of its vertical merger with D1 —a st h elack-of-commitment
eﬀect of vertical integration: it is the integrated ﬁrm’s inability to commit to its own retail
price that reduces its deviation proﬁt. Of course, as in the model with simultaneous moves,
30there is a countervailing punishment eﬀect since the integrated ﬁrm will be able to capture its
downstream aﬃliate’s proﬁt in the punishment phase, πNC. Hence, the integrated U1-D1’s

















Lemma 12 The integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt πdev
int satisﬁes πdev
int ≤ ΠM, where the inequality
is strict if ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated.
Combining the upstream ﬁrms’ incentive constraints (11) and (12), we obtain the critical
discount factor under (single) vertical integration.
Lemma 13 In the model with sequential moves, the critical discount factor (above which up-










As in the baseline model, it is straightforward to show that upstream collusion can be
sustained for any discount factor under vertical integration if ﬁnal goods are homogeneous
and downstream competition is in prices. (Details are available from the authors on request.)
Intuitively, this is achieved by an asymmetric arrangement whereby all upstream ﬁrms sell
through the integrated downstream ﬁrm, which stands ready to undercut the prices of any
unintegrated downstream ﬁrm accepting a deviant upstream oﬀer.
The Collusive Eﬀect of Vertical Integration. In the baseline model with simultaneous moves,
a vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm had two mutually counter-acting
eﬀects: an outlets eﬀect and a punishment eﬀect. We showed there that the outlets eﬀect always
dominates the punishment eﬀect, and so a vertical merger in that model facilitates upstream
collusion. When downstream ﬁrms can react to upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers by changing
their retail prices/quantities, two additional eﬀects arise: the reaction eﬀect and the lack-of-
commitment eﬀect. Since we have shown that the impact of the reaction eﬀect on unintegrated
ﬁrms’ deviation proﬁts is strictly negative; and that of the lack-of-commitment eﬀect on the
integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁts is weakly negative (strictly when goods are diﬀerentiated),
it should not be surprising that our key result — that vertical integration facilitates upstream
collusion — is robust to allowing downstream ﬁrms to condition their retail prices/quantities on
upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers.
Proposition 5 In the model with sequential moves, (single) vertical integration facilitates up-
stream collusion.
We obtain as a corollary that the sequential-move structure facilitates collusion when one
ﬁrm is vertically integrated, b δ
SI
seq < b δ
SI
(note that b δ
NI
seq = b δ
NI
) . We can interpret this result
as suggesting that if the industry contains one integrated ﬁrm, it will be helpful to collusion
31if upstream prices are relatively sluggish in the sense that downstream ﬁrms can change their
prices/quantities more quickly than upstream ﬁrms can.
We have also analyzed the optimal punishment for this sequential timing for the special
case of homogeneous ﬁnal goods and price competition in the downstream market (details are
available from the authors on request). We show that our conclusion — that a vertical merger
between an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm facilitates upstream collusion — continues to hold
under the optimal punishment scheme. Our analysis again illustrates the observation that
simple penal codes (Abreu (1988)) are not optimal in repeated extensive-form games.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have shown how vertical mergers can facilitate upstream collusion. Two im-
portant eﬀects are relevant to the analysis: the outlets eﬀect and the punishment eﬀect.T h e
outlets eﬀect arises because unintegrated upstream ﬁrms are unable to sell through the down-
stream aﬃliates of their integrated upstream rivals when they choose to deviate; this reduces
the proﬁtability of deviation and hence facilitates collusion. The punishment eﬀect, on the
other hand, arises because an integrated ﬁrm cannot be punished as severely as an unintegrated
one when downstream ﬁrms make rents in the punishment phase; this makes sustaining col-
lusion more diﬃcult. We have shown that, under fairly general circumstances (downstream
ﬁrms compete in prices or quantities to sell diﬀerentiated or homogeneous goods), the outlets
eﬀect dominates the punishment eﬀect, so that vertical merger facilitates collusion. We have
also examined the robustness of this conclusion to the secrecy of upstream oﬀers, the use of the
optimal punishment scheme (as opposed to Nash reversion) and to an alternative assumption
about the timing of upstream and downstream pricing choices. The latter extension allowed
us to identify two further competitive eﬀects of vertical merger which may be of interest: the
reaction eﬀect and the lack-of-commitment eﬀect.B o t ho ft h e s ee ﬀects facilitate collusion and
arise when downstream prices or quantities are set after upstream oﬀers have been made. They
result from the downstream ﬁrms’ ability to adjust their downstream strategic variable in re-
sponse to out-of-equilibrium upstream oﬀers. The reaction eﬀect arises because integrated ﬁrms
can respond aggressively in downstream markets to the upstream deviations of their rivals, re-
ducing the latters’ proﬁts from deviation. Integrated ﬁrms can also best-respond downstream
to their own deviant upstream oﬀers: this response is anticipated by the unintegrated down-
stream recipients of such oﬀers and reduces their willingness to pay for deviant contracts. So
this lack-of-commitment eﬀect reduces the integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁts and hence makes
collusion easier to sustain.
Our paper contributes to our understanding of vertical mergers in three ways: by improving
our theoretical understanding of games between vertically-related players; by helping us to
understand the observed structure of vertically-related industries; and by helping us form policy
on vertical mergers. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, the operation of collusive equilibria
where buyers are interdependent and behave strategically has received very little attention.36
In this paper, we have modeled the case where upstream ﬁrms try to collude both to restrict
supply and to extract all the rents from the downstream ﬁrms. One can view this analysis as
36The only exception of which we are aware is Snyder (1996), who examines collusion in the presence of a
single strategic buyer.
32a step on the road towards the more ambitious goal of analyzing collusive agreements where
the upstream and the downstream ﬁrms share the rents to cooperate in restricting supply to
consumers. Our analysis of the design of optimal punishment schemes, where downstream ﬁrms
are given rewards oﬀ-the-equilibrium path for participating in the punishment of upstream ﬁrms,
g i v e su saﬂavor of just how complex such an analysis might become. It also serves to illustrate
that our understanding of non-cooperative games where players need the “consent” of other
players to deviate successfully is still in its infancy, even though this form is quite common
in applications.37 At a more technical level, our analysis of optimal punishment schemes has
revealed that the logic of simple penal codes (Abreu (1988)) breaks down in repeated extensive-
form games: for some discount factors, collusion may be sustainable only by a strategy proﬁle
with the property that the “punishment” depends not only on the identity of the deviator but
is also “ﬁne-tuned” to the details of the deviation made.
Secondly, from a more practical point of view, and despite the lack of theoretical attention,
upstream collusion does seem to be a particular problem in intermediate goods industries, many
of which exhibit substantial vertical integration (see, e.g., Scherer (1980), chapter 6). Our theory
helps us understand why this may be the case, and also why one might see asymmetry in the
degree of vertical integration in such industries. Leaving aside any eﬃciency gains or static
foreclosure eﬀects, our theory identiﬁes two potential motives for vertical merger. Since the ﬁrst
vertical merger reduces the critical discount factor above which collusion is sustainable, vertical
mergers could be driven by the desire to make collusion sustainable when it otherwise would
not be (“the collusive motive”). Collusion becomes easier even though a merger will typically
make deviation from a collusive agreement more tempting for the integrated ﬁrm itself. Indeed,
this observation highlights a further motive for vertical merger even in cases where collusion is
in any case feasible, the “market share motive”. An integrated ﬁrm will typically need to be
granted a larger market share to persuade it not to undercut the collusive price (see Levenstein
(1997) for an example that seems to ﬁt this case). Further, we have shown that while the ﬁrst
vertical merger always facilitates collusion, successive mergers after this may not do so, so that
intermediate levels of integration may be optimal. This is interesting since many industries
seem to have the feature that vertically integrated ﬁrms compete with separated ones, and it is
not always clear why such diﬀering arrangements should arise. (For examples, see Bindemann
(1999) on the oil industry, Woodruﬀ (2002) on the Mexican footwear industry, Slade (1998a, b)
on the UK beer industry and the gasoline retail market in Vancouver, respectively, and Chipty
(2001) and Waterman and Weiss (1996) on the US cable television industry. For an alternative
theoretical rationale for asymmetric outcomes, see Ordover et al. (1990).)
Thirdly, our work is relevant to the formulation of policy towards vertical mergers. Interest-
ingly, to the extent that anti-trust authorities have been concerned about the impact of vertical
mergers on collusion, they too seem to have focused on intermediate goods industries as the rel-
evant area for consideration. In contrast to the existing academic literature, the United States
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984) already anticipate the idea that vertical mergers may
37Here, downstream ﬁrms must accept deviant upstream oﬀers for such deviations to be proﬁtable, but one can
imagine many similar situations where in making a deviation, it “takes two to tango”. Consider, for example, the
case of labor unions trying to present a united front in negotiating with the ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r y—au n i o n - ﬁrm
pair must both defect from their respective collusive arrangements for the deviation to be successful. European
soccer players’ contracts typically prevent them from negotiating with other teams whilst under contract — to
make a proﬁtable deviation from this agreement (which does occur), players must ﬁnd a team willing to negotiate
with them. Similarly, bribed oﬃcials must accept and act on bribes if bribes are to be proﬁtable.
33facilitate collusion, envisaging two ways in which this may occur.38 We relate these two ideas to
our outlets and reaction eﬀects. The ﬁr s ts u g g e s t i o ni st h a tv e r t i c a l merger facilitates upstream
collusion by making it somehow easier to monitor prices. This is an old idea which has yet
to be properly formalized, but which is loosely related to the reaction eﬀe c tp r o p o s e di nt h i s
paper. But rather than impose ad hoc changes in the ability to observe or punish deviations as
an exogenous feature of vertically integrated ﬁrms, we have considered diﬀerences in contracts
and incentives to cheat on a collusive agreement which arise endogenously as a result of vertical
integration. In our base model, vertical integration clearly cannot improve the observability
of prices per se since all contract oﬀers are completely public; and indeed we have shown that
incentives to deviate in our model will be the same even if upstream oﬀers are private infor-
mation, so that observability per se does not matter. But in the light of the results of our
model with sequential timing, we can see that the observability of defections from the collusive
agreement is very relevant if ﬁrms can react to them, and that vertical integration does enhance
the integrated ﬁrm’s ability to react to observed defections, so facilitating collusion. To put it
another way, we show that when upstream prices are sluggish compared to downstream prices,
vertical integration is particularly eﬀective in sustaining collusion.
The second way in which the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines envisage that vertical inte-
gration may facilitate collusion is through the acquisition of a “disruptive buyer”. The Guide-
lines state that a disruptive buyer is one which is substantially diﬀerent from the others, the
idea being that price-cutting to this buyer is particularly attractive, so that the “removal” of
this buyer from the downstream market may signiﬁcantly reduce incentives to cheat on a col-
lusive agreement. Again, this idea has some relation to our theory, but we derive, rather than
impose, the result that the purchase of a downstream buyer by an upstream ﬁrm makes it less
attractive for its rivals to cheat by removing an outlet for their cheating (our ‘outlets’ eﬀect).
Our analysis suggests that the Guidelines may be too restrictive in focusing on buyers which
“diﬀer substantially” from other ﬁrms in the market: even when downstream ﬁrms are sym-
metric, the removal of a downstream buyer can improve collusion possibilities. Moreover, the
theory in this paper suggests that it is not obvious that the acquisition of a buyer whose busi-
ness is particularly attractive will especially facilitate upstream collusion. Such an acquisition
is a double-edged sword since one upstream ﬁrm now owns an attractive outlet for cheating,
so its own incentive to cheat increases (in our model this shows up as the punishment eﬀect).
We examine this issue more closely in a our earlier working paper (Nocke and White (2003))
where we allow for asymmetric downstream ﬁrms. We are able to show for a particular case
that indeed integration with a low-cost or large downstream ﬁrm most facilitates collusion, but
a general analysis identifying “disruptive buyers” awaits further research. Indeed, the dynamic
eﬀects of vertical restraints more generally remain largely unexplored.39
38Though these guidelines are no longer generally used, they have not yet been either withdrawn or replaced.
39In our earlier working paper, Nocke and White (2003), we show that other vertical restraints (exclusive dealing
or retail price maintenance) are only very imperfect substitutes for vertical merger in facilitating collusion. Jullien
and Rey (2000) analyze the idea (related to the notion that vertical restraints may facilitate the monitoring of
prices) that resale price maintenance may facilitate collusion. In an agency model where retailers face demand
shocks which are not observed by wholesalers, resale price maintenance acts to smooth downstream prices, making
cheating easier to detect.
346A p p e n d i x
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose to the contrary that upstream ﬁrm Ui makes a positive proﬁt
on its contract with (unintegrated) downstream ﬁrm Dj.H e n c e , e i t h e r wij > 0 or Fij > 0,
or both. Then we then claim that upstream ﬁrm Uk, k 6= i,h a sap r o ﬁtable deviation. In






=( wij,F ij −ε)






=( wij − ε,Fij) otherwise, where ε is arbitrarily small. Clearly, Dj
prefers this contract to Ui’s oﬀer and will accept it, unless Uk’s oﬀer triggers a change in
some other downstream ﬁrm’s behavior which adversely aﬀects Dj’s proﬁt were it to accept
Uk’s oﬀer. Suppose for the moment that Uk’s deviant oﬀer leaves the acceptance/rejection
decisions of the other downstream ﬁrms unchanged. (Recall that downstream prices are set at
the same time as upstream ﬁrms’ two-part tariﬀ oﬀers, and so cannot be changed in reaction
to Uk’s deviant oﬀer.) In this case, Dj will accept Uk’s deviant oﬀer, and Uk makes a positive
proﬁt on this contract. Hence, Uk’s deviation is proﬁtable, unless it triggers a change in the
acceptance/rejection decision of some other downstream ﬁrm.
Is it possible that, in equilibrium, some downstream ﬁrm Dl sets a positive output or some
price at which it faces positive demand, and yet rejects all of its oﬀers? The answer is no: Dj
would have to pay a ﬁne φ, and so its overall proﬁtw o u l db e−φ, while it could proﬁtably
deviate by setting a quantity of zero or a (very high) price at which demand is nil. Hence, Uk’s
deviation cannot trigger a change in the acceptance/rejection decision of some other downstream
ﬁrm Dl (which, along the equilibrium path, rejects all oﬀers) that is detrimental to Uk’s proﬁt.
The only possible change in the acceptance/rejection of some downstream ﬁrm Dl that may
adversely aﬀect Uk thus arises if in the candidate equilibrium Uk makes a positive proﬁto ni t s
contract with Dl and Uk’s deviation induces Dl to switch suppliers. For this to hold, in the
candidate equilibrium, Dl must be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting Uk’s oﬀer. But
then Uk can, in addition to oﬀering a deviant contract to Dj,o ﬀer a slightly better contract to
Dl so that Dl strictly prefers to accept it. The loss in proﬁto nUk’s oﬀer to Dl can always be
chosen in such a way that it is outweighed by Uk’s gain on its deviant oﬀer to Dj.
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 . It is immediate to see that there is no proﬁtable deviation for a
downstream ﬁrm, either at the pricing stage, or at the acceptance stage. Suppose now that
upstream ﬁrm Ui deviates by oﬀering contracts of the form (wij,F ij) 6=( 0 ,0) to one or more
downstream ﬁrms. Clearly, a deviant contract can be proﬁtable to Ui only if it involves a
positive wholesale price, a positive ﬁxed fee, or both. Suppose that Ui’s deviant oﬀer involves a
positive ﬁxed fee. Since each downstream ﬁrm is still oﬀered the contract (0,0) by each of the
other M − 1 upstream ﬁrms, each downstream ﬁrm would reject the deviant contract, and Ui
would make zero proﬁt. Suppose now that Ui’s deviant oﬀer involves a positive wholesale price.
If it also involves a non-negative ﬁxed fee, it would clearly be rejected in favor of the noncollusive
contract oﬀered by the other upstream ﬁrms. If the deviant oﬀer involves a negative ﬁxed fee,
the downstream ﬁrm would accept it. However, the downstream ﬁrm would in addition accept
the noncollusive contract (0,0) oﬀered by, say Uk, and order all of the inputs from Uk at a
wholesale price of zero, rather than from Ui at a positive wholesale price. Hence, the deviant
Ui would make a loss. Finally, note that there is no incentive for an integrated ﬁrm to deviate
at the pricing stage by changing both its upstream aﬃliate’s contract oﬀer to unintegrated
downstream ﬁr m sa n di t sd o w n s t r e a ma ﬃliate’s retail price.
35P r o o fo fl e m m a5 . At the pricing stage, an unintegrated downstream ﬁrm Dj, j ≥ 2, sets a
price pj >p M (or a quantity qj =0 ). On the other hand, the integrated D1 sets the monopoly
price pM (or the monopoly quantity QM), being oﬀered — for example — the contract (0,F),
0 ≤ F ≤ ΠM by each of the M − 1 unintegrated upstream ﬁrms, where the ﬁxed fee F (and
the probabilities with which D1 accepts the various contracts) can be chosen so that each of
the unintegrated upstream ﬁrms makes an expected per-period proﬁto f(1 − α)ΠM/(M − 1).
Consider now the incentives to deviate for an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm Ui, i ≥ 2.C l e a r l y ,
any deviant oﬀer to D1 that does not leave all of the rents to D1 will be rejected. Moreover,
Ui cannot proﬁtably deviate through the unintegrated downstream ﬁrms since they face zero
demand at their equilibrium prices (or, in the case of quantity competition, they produce zero




By rejecting all unintegrated upstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers, the integrated U1-D1 obtains
a deviation proﬁto fΠM. In the punishment phase, it receives a proﬁto fπNC through its
downstream aﬃliate, where πNC =0in the case of price competition, and πNC > 0 in the case
of quantity competition. The integrated ﬁrm’s incentive constraint is thus given by equation




The assertion follows by setting α =1 .
P r o o fo fl e m m a6 . To see that there exists an equilibrium of the stage game where Dj
obtains all of the monopoly proﬁts, consider the following strategy proﬁle. At the pricing stage,
each upstream ﬁrm oﬀers the contract (0,0) to Dj, and a contract with a suﬃciently large
wholesale price, say (pM +ε,F) with ε>0,F ≥ 0, to all other downstream ﬁrms Di, i 6= j.A t
t h es a m et i m e ,d o w n s t r e a mﬁrm Dj sets price pj = pM (or quantity qj = QM), while Di, i 6= j,
sets price pi >p M (or quantity qi =0 ). At the acceptance stage, each downstream ﬁrm accepts
any contract that leaves it with nonnegative rents, given the acceptance decisions of the other
ﬁrms. Along the equilibrium path, Dj accepts at least one of the contracts oﬀered to it, and
makes the monopoly proﬁt ΠM. It is straightforward to verify that no ﬁrm has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally. To see that there exists an equilibrium of the stage game where all ﬁrms
make zero proﬁts, suppose all upstream ﬁrms make contract oﬀers of the form (∞,∞),a n d
each downstream ﬁrm Dj sets a quantity qj =0or a price pj = ∞.C l e a r l y , n o ﬁrm has an
incentive to deviate.
P r o o fo fl e m m a7 . The proof proceeds in steps. (1) Assuming that Ui has deviated by
oﬀering bribes satisfying bik ≤ bij < min{R,ΠM/2},a n dbi1 + bi2 >R , we derive the optimal
choice of γij such that the equilibrium at the acceptance is in mixed strategies. (2) We show
that any choice of γij (not necessarily the one derived in step (1)) that is followed by the play
of a pure-strategy equilibrium at the acceptance stage, will lead to a higher deviation proﬁt,
and is hence not an optimal punishment. (3) We derive Ui’s optimal deviation under the stated
restrictions on the bribes.
(1) For at least one downstream ﬁrm to use a mixed strategy at the acceptance stage, the
distribution of rewards must satisfy 1 − bik/R ≤ 1 − γik ≡ γij ≤ bij/R (where one inequality
36must be strict since bij +bik >Rby assumption). Suppose ﬁrst that both inequalities are strict
so that there exists an equilibrium in which both Dj and Dk use a mixed strategy. Let θk
denote the probability that Dk accepts Ui’s deviant oﬀer. For Dj to use a mixed strategy, it
has to be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting, and so
bij = θkR +( 1− θk)γijR,
where the l.h.s. gives Dj’s payoﬀ upon accepting Ui’s oﬀer, and the r.h.s. the expected payoﬀ


























The optimal division of rewards, γij, minimizes this expression, subject to the constraint 1 −
bik/R ≤ γij ≤ bij/R. The deviation proﬁt is strictly concave in γij over the relevant range,
and so we obtain a corner solution γij ∈ {bij/R,1 − bik/R}.I t c a n e a s i l y b e v e r i ﬁed that
πdev
i (bij,b ik;bij/R) ≤ πdev
i (bij,b ik;1−bik/R) if and only if bij ≥ bik, which holds by assumption.
Hence, the deviation proﬁt in (13) is minimized if γij = bij/R.I n t h e l i m i t a s γij → bij/R,
downstream ﬁrm Dk rejects Ui’s oﬀer with probability one, while Dj accepts Ui’s oﬀer with
probability (bij + bik − R)/bij ∈ (0,1). (In fact, if γij = bij/R, there exists a continuum of
mixed-strategy equilibria. In all of these, Dk rejects Ui’s oﬀer with probability one, and Dj
accepts the oﬀer with probability larger than or equal to (bij + bik − R)/bij. Hence, the afore-
mentioned equilibrium is the worst mixed-strategy equilibrium from the deviant Ui’s point of













(2) In step (1), we have assumed that γij is chosen such that a mixed-strategy equilibrium
at the acceptance stage exists, and that downstream ﬁrms do indeed play this equilibrium. May
the same or a diﬀerent choice of γij, followed by a pure-strategy equilibrium at the acceptance
stage, lead to a lower deviation proﬁt? The answer is, no. Since Ui oﬀers a weakly larger bribe
to Dj than to Dk (and, so if accepted, Ui’s makes a weakly lower proﬁt on its contract with
Dj than with Dk), the worst possible (from Ui’s point of view) pure-strategy equilibrium at
the acceptance stage entails Dj accepting Ui’s oﬀer for sure, and Dk rejecting for sure. But in
the mixed-strategy equilibrium derived in step (1), Dk also rejects Ui’s oﬀer for sure, but in
addition Dj rejects the deviant oﬀer with positive probability as well.
(3) In the previous steps, we have shown that γij = bij/R, followed by the play of a
mixed-strategy equilibrium (where Dk rejects for sure and Dj rejects with probability (R −
bik)/bij) is the most severe punishment. Given this punishment, we now derive the deviant Ui’s
optimal choice of bribes, under the conditions of the lemma, i.e., bik ≤ bij < min{R,ΠM/2},
and bi1 + bi2 >R . From equation (14), Ui’s deviation proﬁt πdev
i (bij,b ik) under the optimal
37punishment scheme is strictly increasing in bik,g i v e nt h a tbik ≤ bjk.H e n c e ,Ui will optimally
set bik = bjk = b. Maximizing πdev
i (b,b) with respect to b,y i e l d sUi’s proﬁt-maximizing bribe,
b =( 1 /2)
√







P r o o fo fl e m m a8 . The assertion follows from equations (9) and (10). Observe that the
second argument in (9) is one half times the ﬁrst argument, and so this argument can be
dropped. The ﬁrst argument is positive only if δ<1/3,a n dt h eﬁnal argument is positive
only if δ<1/2.T h a t i s ,πdev =0if δ ≥ 1/2. Inserting the ﬁrst argument into the incentive

















































P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 . The assertion obviously holds if we can show that upstream ﬁrms’
incentive constraints are as under public oﬀers. The argument proceeds in two steps.
First, we claim that each upstream ﬁrm can obtain at least the same deviation proﬁt under
secret oﬀers than under public oﬀers. To see this, observe that by making the same deviant
contract oﬀers as under public oﬀers, a deviant upstream ﬁrm can make the same deviation
proﬁt as under public oﬀers. Indeed, suppose an upstream ﬁrm oﬀers the deviant contract
(wM −ε,FM −ε) to all unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, where (wM,FM) is the collusive equi-
librium contract. Since each downstream ﬁrm Dj observes each rival’s price (pM)o rq u a n t i t y
(QM/N), it is optimal for Dj to accept this deviant oﬀer, independently of its downstream
rivals’ acceptance decisions.
Second, we claim that an upstream ﬁrm cannot obtain a larger deviation proﬁt than under
public oﬀers. To see this, note that each ﬁrm has the option of rejecting all contracts, pay the
(vanishingly small) ﬁne φ ≈ 0,a n dm a k eap r o ﬁt of (approximately) zero. Hence, a deviant
upstream ﬁrm can extract a higher deviation proﬁt only if at least one downstream ﬁrm, say
Dj, makes a loss ex post. Since downstream prices are publicly observed, this can occur only
if Dj incorrectly believes that one or more of its downstream rivals reject all of their contracts
—i nw h i c hc a s eDj would face a larger demand (or, under quantity competition, would be able
to fetch a higher price) than otherwise.
Suppose ﬁrst that the deviant ﬁrm is an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm. In this case, all
downstream prices are unchanged, and so each downstream ﬁrm can make a proﬁt of exactly zero
38by accepting the equilibrium oﬀer of a nondeviant upstream ﬁrm (while rejecting all contracts
would result in a vanishingly small loss). Hence, when a downstream ﬁrm receives a deviant
oﬀer from an unintegrated upstream ﬁrm, it must (correctly) believe that its downstream rivals
will continue to be active in this period.
Suppose now that the deviant ﬁrm is the integrated upstream-downstream pair. For a
deviant integrated ﬁrm, it is never optimal to make oﬀers that would induce a downstream ﬁrm
to reject all oﬀers and be inactive as the deviant ﬁrm would make zero proﬁto ns u c hac o n t r a c t .
Instead, the deviant upstream ﬁrm can make a positive proﬁtb yo ﬀering the contract (w0,F0−ε),




and p0 is the integrated ﬁrm’s retail price in the period of deviation. Clearly, it is optimal for each
downstream ﬁrm to accept this oﬀer, independently of its rivals’ acceptance decisions. Given
the assumption of wary beliefs, each downstream ﬁrm thus expects the deviant integrated ﬁrm
to make oﬀers to other downstream ﬁrms that will induce these to be active. Since downstream
prices are publicly observed, this means that the integrated ﬁrm’s deviation proﬁt is bounded
from above by the monopoly proﬁt.
Remarks on secret oﬀers. In the main text, we brieﬂy remarked on the case when secret
oﬀers are never publicly revealed. Here we examine that case in greater detail. Assume that
ﬁnal goods are homogeneous and retail competition is in prices, and that downstream ﬁrms
have wary beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. To see that it is possible to construct a collusive
equilibrium where the incentive constraints are as under public oﬀers, suppose upstream ﬁrm
Ui has deviated by undercutting Uj’s oﬀer to downstream ﬁrm Dk,a n dt h a tDk has accepted
this deviant oﬀer in preference to the equilibrium oﬀer of Uj. The collusive strategy proﬁle
then prescribes that: (i) in all future periods, both Ui and Uj oﬀer (0,0) to all (unintegrated)
downstream ﬁrms forever; (ii) in all future periods, downstream ﬁrm Dk charges a retail price of
zero; (iii) whenever an oﬀ-equilibrium retail price is observed, all ﬁrms switch to the symmetric
noncollusive equilibrium (involving contract oﬀers of (0,0) and retail prices of zero) in all future
periods; here, this means that two periods after Uihas deviated, the whole industry has reverted
to the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium.
Clearly, neither Ui nor Uj have an incentive to deviate from this collusive strategy proﬁle:
given that one upstream ﬁrm oﬀers (0,0) to all downstream ﬁrms, it is optimal for the other to
do so as well. (For this, it is irrelevant that Uj does not observe the identity of the upstream
ﬁrm that has undercut its oﬀer to Dk.) Further, Dk has no incentive to deviate: having wary
beliefs, Dk believes that Ui also has deviated through all other downstream ﬁrms (since this is
in Ui’s best interest) and will therefore expect all other downstream ﬁrms to charge a price of
zero in the next period (and all periods thereafter). Therefore, it is optimal for Dk to charge
a price of zero in the next period (and thereafter). Finally, when observing an oﬀ-equilibrium
retail price, it is optimal for each upstream to forever oﬀer the contract (0,0) to all downstream
ﬁrms since it (correctly) expects its upstream rivals to do the same.
However, if ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated (or downstream competition is in quantities),
then it will in general not be possible for upstream ﬁrms to extract all of the monopoly rents
along the collusive equilibrium path if oﬀers are never publicly revealed. This follows from two
observations. First, in this case, downstream ﬁrms are better oﬀ in the punishment phase than
along the collusive equilibrium path since πNC > 0 in the symmetric noncollusive equilibrium.
Second, since contract oﬀers are never publicly revealed, ﬁrms face an “inference problem” when
Dj rejects Ui’s oﬀer: Did Dj reject the oﬀer because some other upstream ﬁrm deviated by
39undercutting Ui’s contract (which should trigger a punishment phase) or because Dj deviated on
its own account (which should not trigger punishment) in the hope of triggering the punishment
phase?
P r o o fo fl e m m a9 . Oﬀ the equilibrium path, the strategy proﬁle prescribes that strategies
form a Nash equilibrium, and so no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. (The proof of existence
of a Nash equilibrium in every subgame is standard, and is omitted here.) What remains to
be shown is that no upstream ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate at the contract oﬀer stage; the
proof proceeds along the same lines as that of lemma 2.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 1 . Consider a deviation by the unintegrated upstream ﬁrm Ui, i ≥ 2.
Suppose ﬁrst that Ui deviates by oﬀering contracts of the form (0,F ij) to each of the N − 1
unintegrated downstream ﬁrms, and that the ﬁxed fee Fij is low enough that each downstream
ﬁrm will accept Ui’s oﬀer. Then, at the downstream pricing stage, each downstream ﬁrm will
set a price of pNC (or a quantity of qNC), and so the integrated D1’s proﬁtw i l lb eπNC,w h i l e
the deviant Ui can extract at most (N −1)πNC < (N −1)ΠM/N from the N −1 unintegrated
downstream ﬁrms. Hence, in this case, Ui’s deviation proﬁt is indeed less than (N −1)ΠM/N.
Suppose now that Ui deviates by oﬀering contracts that involve a positive wholesale price,
wij > 0, for at least one downstream ﬁrm Dj (or a high ﬁxed fee Fij so that at least one
unintegrated downstream Dj will reject the deviant oﬀer). In this case, the integrated D1 will
(in that period) obtain a share of the industry proﬁtt h a ts t r i c t l ye x c e e d s1/N (since D1 faces
an eﬀective wholesale price of zero, while either at least one of its rivals faces a higher wholesale
p r i c eo re l s ea tm o s tN − 2 unintegrated downstream ﬁrms are active), which the deviant Ui
will not be able to extract. Since the industry proﬁt is bounded from above by the monopoly
proﬁt, this means that the deviant Ui can extract strictly less than (N − 1)ΠM/N from the
N − 1 unintegrated downstream ﬁrms.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 2 . The inequality πdev
int ≤ ΠM holds trivially: if πdev
int > ΠM,a tl e a s t
one downstream ﬁrm would make a loss and would thus have a proﬁtable deviation. We now
show that πdev
int < ΠM if ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated. To see this, note that for the deviant
upstream ﬁrm to extract all of the monopoly proﬁts when ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated (by
downstream ﬁrm), it would need to sell though all of the N downstream ﬁrms, and each of
the downstream ﬁrms would need to set the price pM (or quantity qM = QM/N). Suppose
now that the integrated U1-D1 oﬀers contracts of the form (w0
1j,F0
1j) to each unintegrated
downstream ﬁrm Dj, j ≥ 2. Suppose further that all unintegrated downstream ﬁrms accept
and set the monopoly price pM (or quantity qM). Because of double marginalization (which
must arise when products are diﬀerentiated), the wholesale price w0
1j must be less than the
monopoly price, w0
1j <p M. At the downstream pricing stage, the integrated U1-D1 would then









j <p M, the integrated U1-D1 would thus optimally set a retail price p1 <p M.B u tt h i s
means that the integrated ﬁrm cannot extract all of the monopoly proﬁts. (The same argument
applies when downstream competition is in quantities rather than prices.)
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 . >From lemmas 10 and 13, it follows that vertical integration
40facilitates upstream collusion, b δ
SI









int <M· ΠM. (15)
Lemma 11 implies that πdev
unint + πNC < ΠM, while lemma 12 states that πdev
int ≤ ΠM. Hence,
equation (15) must hold, and so b δ
SI




Abreu, D. (1986): “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 39(1), 191—225.
(1988): “On the Theory of Inﬁnitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Economet-
rica, 56(2), 383—396.
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, R. Griffith, and F. Zilibotti (2004): “Vertical Integration
and Technology: Theory and Evidence,” NBER Working Paper 10997, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Aumann, R. J., and M. B. Maschler (1995): Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Aumann, R. J., M. B. Maschler, and R. E. Stearns (1968): “Repeated Games of In-
complete Information: An Approach to the Non-Zero Sum Case,” Report of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmement Agency ST-143, reprinted in Aumann and Maschler (1995).
Baldwin, L., R. C. Marshall, and J.-F. Richard (1997): “Bidder Collusion at Forest
Service Timber Sales,” Journal of Political Economy, 105(4), 657—699.
Bindemann, K. (1999): “Vertical Integration in the Oil Industry: A Review of the Literature,”
Journal of Energy Literature, 5(1), 3—26.
Bonanno, G., and J. Vickers (1988): “Vertical Separation,” Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 36(3), 257—265.
Bowley, A. L. (1924): The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Chen, Y. (2001): “On Vertical Mergers and their Competitive Eﬀects,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 32(4), 667—685.
Chen, Y., and M. Riordan (2003): “Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post
Cartelization,” Mimeo, University of Colorado and Columbia University.
Chipty, T. (2001): “Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the
Cable Television Industry,” American Economic Review, 91(3), 428—453.
Choi, J. P., and S.-S. Yi (2001): “Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Speciﬁca-
tions,” Rand Journal of Economics, 31(4), 717—743.
41Compte, O., F. Jenny, and P. Rey (2002): “Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion,”
European Economic Review, 46(1), 1—29.
Friedman, J. W. (1971): “A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 38(1), 1—12.
Hart, O., and J. Tirole (1990): “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics.
Hendricks, K., R. H. Porter, and G. Tan (2003): “Bidding Rings and the Winner’s
Curse: The Case of Federal Oﬀshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,” NBER Working Paper
9836, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Jullien, B., and P. Rey (2000): “Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion,” Idei working
paper, University of Toulouse.
Klass, M., and M. Salinger (1995): “Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide
Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?,” Antitrust Bulletin,4 0 ,
667—698.
Kwoka, J. E., and L. J. White (1999): The Antitrust Revolution. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 3rd edn.
Levenstein, M. C. (1997): “Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-
World War I Bromine Industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(2), 117—137.
Mailath, G. J., V. Nocke, and L. White (2004): “When the Punishment Must Fit the
Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games,” PIER
Working Paper 04-039, University of Pennsylvania.
McAfee, R. P., and M. Schwartz (1994): “Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contract-
ing: Non-Discrimination, Exclusivity and Uniformity,” American Economic Review, 84(1),
210—230.
Nocke, V., and L. White (2003): “Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?,”
PIER Working Paper 03-033, University of Pennsylvania.
Ordover, J. A., G. Saloner, and S. C. Salop (1990): “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,”
American Economic Review, 80(1), 127—142.
Porter, R. H. (1983): “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-
1886,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 301—314.
Rey, P., and J. Tirole (2003): “A Primer on Foreclosure,” Mimeo, University of Toulouse.
Rey, P., and T. Vergé (2004): “Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts,” Rand Journal
of Economics, 35(4), 728—746.
Riordan, M. (1998): “Anti-Competitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm,” American
Economic Review, 88(5), 1232—1248.
42Riordan, M., and S. Salop (1995): “Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Ap-
proach,” Antitrust Law Journal, 63, 513—568.
Scherer, F. M. (1980): Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance.H o u g h t o n
Miﬄin, Boston, second edn.
Segal, I. (1999): “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2),
337—388.
Slade, M. E. (1998a): “Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses
Lead to Higher Beer Prices,” Economic Journal, 108(3), 565—602.
(1998b): “Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline
Markets,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 14(1), 84—113.
Snyder, C. M. (1996): “A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power,” Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 27(4), 747—769.
Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization.M I TP r e s s ,C a m b r i d g eM a s s .
Tosdal, H. R. (1917): “The German Steel Syndicate,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 31(2),
259—306.
Vives, X. (1999): Oligopoly Pricing. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Waterman, D., and A. A. Weiss (1996): “The Eﬀects of Vertical Integration Between Cable
Television and Pay Cable Networks,” Journal of Econometrics, 72(1-2), 357—395.
Woodruff, C. (2002): “Non-Contractible Investments and Vertical Integration in the Mexican
Footwear Industry,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(8), 1197—1224.
43